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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
The question of animal thought and language 
     Thought and language have in various forms of interdependence been seen as the 
expression of what some have seen as the highest intellectual abilities of humans and thereby 
what separates us from the rest of the living world [Donaldson 1990 (1975); Premack 2004]. 
While the advent of modern science blurred the sharp distinction between humans and other 
animals in the cognitive domain [Tomasello and Call 1997]  there has at the same time been 
an attempt to maintain a division between human and nonhuman animals, mainly by arguing 
that language and its connection to thought sets humans apart. "Thought" is here to be 
understood broadly, as advanced cognitive operations such as, but not limited to, intentional 
communication, planning, and mental hypothesizing. Modern evolutionary biology 
[Burghardt 2009; Darwin 1859] has affirmed the connectedness between humans and the rest 
of the living world. The idea of "mindless brutes" has not held up to scrutiny of behavioral 
studies [re. chimpanzees Furlong et al. 2005; re. a range of genera and species Griffin and 
Speck 2004; re. chimpanzees Kuhlmeier et al. 1998]. In this dissertation I aim to initiate an 
empirical investigation of whether and how the possessions of elements of human language, 
symbols, influence bonobos, Pan paniscus, in other cognitive areas than their linguistic 
abilities. In particular, I will investigate categorization and acquisition of new symbolic 
relations. I will also address conceptual and methodological issues that present obstacles in 
understanding the relationship between language and cognition more generally, such as the 
debate whether captive studies can claim to represent the natural capacities of the ape. 
Finally, I will discuss the implications of this research for theories of language evolution. 
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 The tendency to sharply differentiate between humans and apes by reserving 
language for humans persists. Recently, scientists have highlighted genes associated with 
language, which seem to have undergone recent selection in the human lineage [Coop et al. 
2008; Ely et al. 2002a; Ely et al. 2002b]. The involved gene is FOXp2, which is found 
throughout vertebrates and is involved in a range of regulatory processes. In humans, it is 
thought to be involved in language, specifically this is based upon the language deficiencies 
caused by its malfunction. The differences in the versions found in humans, chimpanzees 
(Pan troglodytes), and orangutans (Pongo sp) indicate that the changes found in the human 
version of the gene exhibits traits consistent with recent selective pressure. 
 This discussion regarding the human-animal divide also has implications for how 
thought and language interact. Thought has traditionally been seen as dependent upon 
language, but if this relationship is deterministic, many insights from comparative and 
evolutionary biology are difficult to account for, as there are strong indications of complex 
cognitive capacities of apes and other species that do not use language ([Hare and Tomasello 
2005; Tomasello and Call 1997; Van Schaik 2006; van Schaik et al. 2006].  Alternatively, if 
language and cognition are not intimately linked, a nonhuman species might be deemed 
capable of thought.  However, this position carries with it implications for language 
evolution and for the nature and relationship between thought and language. It implies that 
language did not confer cognitive advantages as it is a separate ability. If language did not 
confer cognitive selective advantages, other explanations must be invoked, which is most 
often the advantage of improved communication [Pinker 1994]. Other possible explanations 
are language as a spandrel [Spandrel as understood by Gould and Lewontin 1979],  or 
language being sexually selected [Darwin 1871]. This approach also raises the issue of how 
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language relates to the cognition and communication of other species. Advocates of one 
version of this position, put forward by Chomsky [Chomsky 1979], holds that language is a 
separate ability for acquiring grammar, not connected to thought or to nonhuman 
communication, and that evolutionary questions are consequently not relevant. Others have 
suggested evolutionary scenarios that could explain how a brain module for grammar 
evolved [Bickerton 1990; Pinker 1994]. The prediction from this position is that the 
possession of symbolic language would not significantly alter an organism's cognition in 
other domains. In the next section I will first discuss how and why the question of the 
evolution of language and its relationship to thought  are difficult to address, why they are 
important, and then outline this dissertation.  
An interdisciplinary endeavor 
 Scholars of anthropology, biology, linguistics, and experimental cognitive 
psychology study human thought and language. Their focus ranges from the cultural 
anthropologist's studies of how language, thought, and culture interact to the linguist's aim to 
understand what underlies the structure of sentences, to the psychologist's focus on 
experimental control of variables to dissect how different parts of human cognition interact 
and perform their function. The biologist focuses on the neural and anatomical apparatus 
used for thought and language, as well as using the comparative and phylogenetic methods to 
address evolutionary questions.  
 While a number of fields have progressed immensely in their understanding of what 
thought and language is, and the operations thereof, it has proven hard to tackle the issue of 
how thought and language, cognition and symbolic expression, interact. The major obstacle 
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is the fact that all healthy and minimally socialized humans develop language, leaving no 
control group. Pre-linguistic children are only pre-linguistic in the sense that they do not yet 
express themselves in a symbolic language. However, there are indications of their ability to 
comprehend words earlier than they express them [Mandler 2004; Mandler 2007], and the 
use of infant-sign language has pushed the barrier for symbolic communication even earlier 
in the infants' development  [Thompson et al. 2007]. It is also known that human infants will 
develop language given a minimum of social and speech stimuli [Candleland 1993], which 
questions their status as non-linguistic. While, as argued by West-Eberhardt [West-Eberhard 
2003], it is crucial to view phenotypic properties of an organism in developmental terms, it is 
difficult to distinguish immaturity and the lack of a developed symbolic code in a pre-
linguistic infant. Cases of isolated feral children have indicated the importance of early 
exposure for the proper development of language [Candleland 1993], but due to their social 
isolation, at least from humans and human culture, they do not provide a proper control 
group for distinguishing cognition with or without a symbolic code of communication. 
People who either lost or did not develop language due to illness or injury are also 
problematic in that there is no clear way to draw conclusions from a pathological to an 
average state. These groups may provide important clues as to what cognition without a 
symbolic code would be like and how symbols interact with cognition in general, but there 
are limits to the conclusions that can be drawn and they cannot stand alone as control groups 
for comparison with ordinary humans.  
 Another option for studying the influence of symbols in general, and language in 
particular, is interspecies comparison, which is widely used for cognitive studies. However, 
other species, while capable of efficient and sophisticated communication, might not use 
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what we understand as a symbolic code, if by symbolic code is meant a system of 
conventionalized signs that carry meaning.  An example is the claim that the dance of Apis, 
bees, can be seen as conveying information symbolically [Munz 2005], though this position 
is not wildly held. This is not meant to deny the existence of symbolic communication in a 
wide range of species. Symbolic communication might be present, but currently the data does 
not allow a strong foundation for comparing thought and language in humans with symbolic 
communication and cognition in other species in order to draw conclusions about human 
evolution. For instance, in the case that symbolic thought and communications was granted 
to bees, for instance, intraspecific comparison would remain difficult since there would be no 
control group without symbolic capacities.  
 A more appropriate non-human group for conducting comparisons regarding the 
cognition of symbolically competent and non-symbolically competent individuals does exist. 
Captive apes have been able to acquire elements of human language and communicate 
symbolically on a daily basis [Gardner and Gardner 1985; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1985; 
Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1998]. Specifically, bonobos (P. paniscus), residing at the Great 
Ape Trust of Iowa, Des Moines, are the subjects of the studies I conducted for this 
dissertation. By comparing these apes with apes that do not possess a symbolic system of 
communication, at least not in the form of human linguistic words, we are better able to 
interpret the influence of symbols on the cognitive abilities of an organism. Bonobos’ 
evolutionary closeness to humans [Parish and De Waal 2000] further provides a basis for 
constructing evolutionary scenarios, especially when combined with the already existing 
research on human evolution in general [for instance Donald 1997; Donald 2001; Jablonka 
and Lamb 2005; Klein and Edgar 2002], and language evolution in particular [for instance 
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Deacon 1997; Schoenemann 2009]. The close relatedness of Pan and Homo makes this the 
best comparison currently available in terms of homology. Studying how symbols affect an 
ape mind could provide insight into how symbols affected the hominid brain and thereby, 
insight into a crucial part of human evolution.  
Dissertation organization 
 The first chapter in this dissertation will seek to place my research within the context 
of the ongoing debate between certain prominent researchers of captive and wild apes  
regarding how best to compare ape and human cognition. I will argue that captive research is 
important for comparative cognitive and communication studies, and that captive ape 
research design needs to account for both how verbal instructions influences performance 
and for the possibility that symbolic communication might influence the cognition in other 
domains. Further, certain terms, in particular "natural environment" obscures the debate.  
 Chapter two examines the performance of a group of symbolically competent 
bonobos on a categorization task, comparing them to bonobos without symbolic 
competencies. This will indicate whether the possession of a symbol facilitates the learning 
and application of a natural category; this is to say, a set of items encountered in daily life 
that are regarded as belonging together. This will also address the issue of whether higher or 
lower level categories differ in terms of difficulty, in the sense that "food" is a higher level 
category than "fruit" or "apple" and "clothes" is a higher level category than "coat" or "hat". I 
will also provide data from experimental testing of each individual's language skills.  Such 
tests were administered to correctly classify the study subjects according to their symbolic 
skills.  
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 The third chapter deals with the acquisition of auditory and visual arbitrary 
associations, a stylized form of symbolism, and any difference between the two groups of 
apes in terms of learnability. A more general assessment of whether a visual or an auditory 
association is learned faster is also made. 
  In the fourth chapter, I discuss my findings in the light of scenarios of language 
evolution. Scenarios of language evolution differ regarding whether language is a recent 
independent addition to the hominid, bipedal ape,  mind or a reconfiguration of cognitive 
abilities already present, a co-option. While there have been some attempts to pass beyond 
this dichotomy, there still is a deep divide. Some recent debate centers rather on the weight to 
attach to each, as well as on the communication medium used by the earliest languages. 
Clarifying the influence of symbols on cognition, and on the ability to acquire auditory or 
visual stimuli can help clarify this debate.  
The study subjects 
 The study subjects are a group of six bonobos, residing at the Great ape Trust of 
Iowa, Des Moines. In the summer of 2005, I began working with Kanzi (male, b. 1980), 
Panbanisha (female, b. 1985), Matata (female, b. 1970), Nyota (male, b. 1998), Maisha 
(male, b. 2000), Elikya (female, b. 1997), and the late male Nathan (2000-2009). Since then, 
Nathan passed away and Elikya gave birth to the newest member of the family, Teco, born 
June 1, 2010. Kanzi and Panbanisha are widely known for their linguistic abilities [Savage-
Rumbaugh et al. 1998] and besides the scientific papers based on their abilities, they have 
been the subjects of numerous documentaries and magazine articles in the popular press 
[Kluger 2010; NHK 1993]. For more information on the upbringing of each of the bonobo 
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subjects in this dissertation (Kanzi, Panbanisha, Maisha, Nyota, Elikya, and Matata), consult 
appendix 1. A schematics of their current living quarters can be found in appendix 2. Elikya 
started out as a participant in this research, but she was not interested in doing the 
experiments. Months of attempts to get her interested did not improve her motivation, and 
she was therefore dropped from the study. 
 
The main entrance to the bonobo home at the Great Ape Trust of Iowa a sunny  late fall afternoon 
 
 This research project traces its roots back to the LANA (Language Analogue Project)  
project initiated by Duane Rumbaugh in 1971 in collaboration with Enst von Glasersfeld, at 
what came to be known as LRC, Language Research Center, in Atlanta, Georgia. The young 
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female chimpanzee Lana learned to use a computer keyboard containing symbols, or 
lexigrams, to request items and control her environment. Lana acquired a range of stock 
sentences that she used for this purpose, mainly interacting with a computer. It was noted, 
though, that her communication reached new levels when a human friend took part in the 
communication. The sentences had to be strung together in accordance with a simple 
grammar, named Yerkish after the early pioneer primatologist, Robert Yerkes [Rumbaugh 
1977].  Sue Savage-Rumbaugh joined the project in the 70's and initiated the next step with 
the two young chimpanzees, Sherman and Austin. The lexigram pool was expanded, and the 
focus shifted from grammar to symbols and categorization and on facilitating the use of 
symbols in communication between apes in a cooperative paradigm [Savage-Rumbaugh 
1986]. While Sherman and Austin learned to use symbols to communicate with each other 
and were able to use symbols in tasks such as food-sharing and tool-use [Savage-Rumbaugh 
et al. 1978a; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1978b], this was a laborious trial-and error process.  
They learned to categorize not just items but also the lexigrams.  For example, they could 
classify lexigrams signifying foods as belonging together and classify lexigrams signifying 
forms of tools as belonging together. Savage-Rumbaugh's assessment is that while they 
learned symbols and used these symbols in a cooperative task with a conspecific, they did not 
do so spontaneously but needed extensive training, and they did not exhibit much creativity 
in their use of the lexigrams, e.g. they did not employ them in new communicative situations 
[Savage-Rumbaugh 1986].  
 The subjects of this study entered the research project when Matata arrived at the 
LRC in 1980, accompanied by her adoptive baby son, Kanzi.  Savage-Rumbaugh was 
interested in studying whether a bonobo could learn to use the lexigrams as the chimpanzees 
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had. However, after hours of drilling, there was little sign of learning. It would take many 
trials for Matata to learn to associate a lexigram with an item, and the learning would be 
forgotten fast [Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin 1994]. Mother and son were separated for the 
first time when Kanzi was about 2.5 years old. On that occasion, Kanzi immediately started 
using the lexigrams and appeared to understand spoken English. The research method shifted 
from focusing on training to creating as stimulating and interesting a life as possible for 
Kanzi, and to using words and lexigrams in daily activities [Lyn and Savage-Rumbaugh 
2000; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 2001].  
 Kanzi's comprehension of novel spoken sentences was compared to a 2.5-year old 
human child when he was around eight years old. In that study, Kanzi performed slightly 
better than the human infant [Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1993].  The bonobo Mulika, Kanzi's 
younger sister, was then added to the research project, with a focus on environment and early 
exposure. She passed away at an early age, which means her language skills were not 
formally documented and analyzed (or maybe even fully developed yet), but the account is 
that she was highly skilled (pers comm.). To investigate whether species could account for 
the difference betweeen Kanzi and the chimpanzees Sherman and Austin (and other ape 
language projects using chimpanzees), Savage-Rumbaugh co-reared Matata's daughter 
Panbanisha with a common chimpanzee, Panpanzee. Though there were differences in speed 
and timing of development and which skills developed the furthest, both apes acquired the 
lexigrams [Savage-Rumbaugh 1984]. Panpanzee did not follow the bonobos to Des Moines 
but is still living in Atlanta. 
  The next phase of the project was the raising of bonobo Nyota, Panbanisha's son. 
William Fields, currently Scientific Director of the Great Ape Trust, functioned as the main 
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human parent of Nyota. There were many expectations regarding the results of the second 
generation of language-competent apes of which Nyota's younger brother, the late Nathan 
was also a part. However, many factors have lead to the result that there is currently no 
comprehensive body of published data on how and what the second generation has learned.  
For instance, the move from Atlanta to Des Moines meant an interruption in the research 
program. Ethnographic reports are available [Fields et al. 2007] and, as I point out in my 
discussion of my results, in particular in relation to Nyota, there might be a need to 
reevaluate methods of measuring language skills. The bonobos Maisha (born 2000) and 
Elikya (born 1997), Matata's offspring, have been serving as a control group, being exposed 
to a rich life but not the human enculturation and symbolic exposure that characterized the 
lives of Kanzi, Panbanisha, and Nyota.   
Ape language research 
 My research must be situated within the larger context of ape language research, 
which has a varied history, especially regarding methodology used. Here, it is important to 
note the shifting paradigms and conceptions of what it would mean for an ape to acquire 
language, and how to facilitate that acquisition, over the decades. For the current study, this 
background is significant as the background of the study subjects and their abilities. My 
research builds upon insights gained in the bonobo research program, and this program builds 
upon insights gained through the shifting approaches to what an ape can learn, and how it 
learns it. 
 One of the earliest projects on ape language was initiated by the Kelloggs who cross-
fostered the chimpanzee Gua with their son Donald [Kellogg 1933]. Later, the Hayes raised 
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the chimpanzee Vicki much as a human child [Hayes 1951]. Both focused on spoken 
language, and the hope was that by being surrounded by spoken human language, the 
subjects would start imitating words. However, after several years the apes could only say a 
couple of words, and they were poorly articulated and hardly understandable. This was 
assumed to be due to a feature of the chimpanzee vocal tract, a high larynx, though currently 
there are arguments that this might rather be an issue of orofacio motorcontrol, this is to say 
not merely vocal tract anatomy but neural control over the movements possible [Lieberman 
2007]. Therefore, later projects shifted to use either visual symbols or sign language.  
 Project Washoe, conducted by the Gardeners and initiated in 1967, continued by 
Roger Fouts, focused on sign language [Gardner and Gardner 1985].  Washoe is now 
deceased, but other chimpanzees that acquired sign language in the same project are alive 
and sign with their caretakers. While Washoe learned around 200 signs, criticism against the 
claims of language in this project focused on subjective accounts of Washoe's utterances that 
were hard to document and verify, and of a lack of syntax in the utterances [Terrace 1985]. 
This form of criticism underscores the focus on grammar in the production of sentences, 
following the Chomskian turn in linguistics (see below).  
 Rumbaugh, with the Lana project, focused on "can an ape create a sentence" 
questions, employing the lexigrams and thereby avoiding the debate about interpretation of 
signing apes. While it might not always be easy to distinguish what a signing ape is signing, 
there is little room to debate what lexigram an ape is touching, in particular when the 
keyboard is computerized. To counter the other objections of anthropomorphism and human 
influence, the researcher was further removed through this arrangement, which was an 
13 
 
attempt at scientific objectivity that, it was argued, had been lacking in the home-rearing of 
Washoe and Vicki.  
 Using another approach, Terrrace attempted to teach the chimpanzee Nim Chimpsky 
sign language. This project focused on production of grammar and utilized a combination of 
elaborate and long sessions of teaching sign language to Nim in home-rearing conditions 
[Terrace 1979].  Terrace concluded that no ape could learn language and that Nim had fooled 
him, merely repeating and imitating signs, not volunteering new information or making 
grammatical sentences.  However, others have raised the issues of whether too many teachers 
and caretakers in Nim's life, a rigid training regiment separated from the rest of his life, and 
non-fluent human signers, might be responsible for the failure of the project [Segerdahl et al. 
2005].  
 The Sherman and Austin project acknowledged that language is communicative and 
the teaching method used needs to incorporate that insight while maintaining the benefits of 
the lexigram board. Kanzi's development of language came as a surprise and spurred a 
rethinking of methods and assumptions, such as anthropomorphism. Kanzi's 
accomplishments highlighted the need for early exposure in language development and the 
need to use language as part of daily life with emotionally important others for it to be 
meaningful. It also stressed the need to differentiate between first and second language 
learning and how the  assumptions made by the researcher regarding the abilities of the apes 
influence the skills they develop, just as a human child needs to be treated as an intentional 
agent to become one. This raised the issues of anthropomorphism, which had to be addressed 
in that developing the language skills of Panbanisha and Kanzi demanded assuming they 
were capable of developing those skills. It means posing anthropomorphism as a form of 
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methodological assumption, needed to foster the linguistic skills that are then later studied 
using rigorous methods [Miles 1997; Segerdahl et al. 2005]. 
Bonobos 
 A critically endangered species and long conflated with its sister species, the common 
chimpanzee, bonobos are only found on the left bank of the Congo river in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), in habitats of mainly deep forest but also some woodland 
[Thompson 1995]. The late recognition of bonobos as a species and civil war in the DRC has 
delayed the field studies of bonobos, which means that we know less about this species than 
the other great apes. However, our knowledge is advancing. Captive studies have classified 
bonobos as more cooperative [Hare and Kwetuenda; Hare et al. 2007], more egalitarian and 
female-dominated [Stevens et al. 2008; Vervaecke et al. 2000] compared to the common 
chimpanzee. The story of the sexually active hippie "make love not war" bonobo and the 
war-mongering brutal chimpanzee males has captured the public imagination, although the 
degree of differences between the two species has been debated intensely [Stanford 1998]. It 
has also led some researchers to look at implications for human evolution, stating that since 
we are as evolutionary close to the bonobos as to chimpanzees, we also share traits with the 
bonobo via a last common ancestor. This means that war-fare, violence, and dominance 
hierarchies might not be encoded in our DNA as some have thought in looking only to a 
chimpanzee model [Parish and De Waal 2000].  The hunting behavior of chimpanzees has 
been used in this context. However, hunting has recently been observed among bonobos 
[Surbeck and Hohmann 2008], which indicates that the dichotomous picture of chimpanzees 
and bonobos probably does not present the whole story.  
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 The issue of the frequent sexual behavior of bonobos relative to all other primates 
save humans has stirred much controversy and curiosity. The scientific debate has focused on 
whether this is an artifact of captive conditions or a characteristic of their behavior across 
living conditions [Stanford 1998]. This issue has not been settled, as some studies show no 
difference in frequency of copulation between the two species, while others maintain that 
there is a species difference both in form, function, and frequency [Hashimoto and Furuichi 
2006; Woods and Hare 2010]. 
 The matriarchal structure of the bonobo societies studied needs qualification also. 
While it sometimes is portrayed as that females are solely in charge [Stevens et al. 2006; 
Stevens and Gilby 2004], female dominance more accurately means that the dominant 
individual  will be a female. In other words, the males do not reach the top of the hierarchy. 
This is obtained mainly by coalitions, where females use their strength in numbers to oppose 
males that aim to use their physical force to dominate.  
 Another important feature of bonobo behavior is the absence of tool behavior outside 
of captivity. In captivity, these apes can become highly proficient tool makers, and it is 
possible that the reason tool use among wild bonobos has not been observed is the short time 
period they have been studied and consequently, the behavior is present but we have yet to 
observe it.  Kanzi and Panbanisha have acquired the skill of making stone tools by knapping, 
bimanual bifurcation as the first hominid were thought to make their tools [Schick et al. 
1999].  For the current study, this is important, as tool making has been seen as closely 
related to language in human evolution and recent neurological research has indicated 
overlap between brain areas involved in tool making and language processing [Stout et al. 
2008].  
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The thought and language debate  
 The contemporary debate about language, thought, and the evolution thereof can be 
broadly  categorized (and potentially simplified) as taking place between two groups, who 
trace their heritage back to classic empiricist and classic rationalist philosophy, respectively. 
The first group sees language as an innate species-specific ability, the main proponent of this 
position being linguist Noam Chomsky, who echoes rationalist arguments traced back to 
Descartes [Chomsky 1983]. Other scientists see language as purely learned, mainly by 
association [Skinner 1957; Skinner 1986; Sundberg 1996]. That position puts language in the 
reach of other species, at least in principle, as it is based on simple learning mechanisms that 
we share. The latter position has its roots back in empiricism, the classic version of which 
was put forward by Hume [Hume 1978 (1739)]. However, before elaborating these positions, 
it is important to go back to the roots of our thinking about language and mind in ancient 
Greek philosophy.  
The Greek Heritage 
 Before the advent of modern linguistics, language was primarily studied for its 
perceived access to the human mind, an idea that can be found in 20th century ape language 
research [Hayes 1951]. For Plato, language was a medium for thinking and served the 
purpose of conveying the relationship between thought and the external objects of thought. 
 When I speak, I am thinking of something and you understand what I am thinking 
about [Plato 1998].  
 In accordance with his general epistemological framework, placing emphasis on real 
knowledge not being about physical objects in the world but about the eternal forms/ideas of 
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which the physical objects are only vague instantiations, words and objects did not have a 
conventional relationship, as is a fundamental assumption today, but shared a deeper 
connection. It was, in other words, no coincidence that "chair" signified chair.  However, 
Aristotle dismissed that claim, and though he did not have any modern theory of language or 
evolution, he did establish the premise that a word is a convention [Allan 2004].   
 Aristotle viewed language as a way of studying the structure of thought. While his 
focus was on the declaration, as a way of studying truth and falsity and how those features 
are expressed in language, he did acknowledge that language is often used for other purposes, 
which is today studied under the fields of pragmatics and speech act theory [Austin 1975]. 
Empiricism vs. Rationalism 
 16th century philosopher Descartes asserted that the human mind comes equipped 
with certain innate ideas, a conclusion he reached when discussing the problems of solipsism 
and true knowledge [Descartes 2006 (1637)]. Is it ever possible to be certain that the 
knowledge I have is of an external world and not just a demon manipulating my mind? How 
do I cross the barrier from my subjective experience to validate it as knowledge of an 
external world? How can I know that the knowledge I have is true and not distorted? This 
argument leads to the famous "Cogito ergo sum", I think therefore I am, which established 
Descartes’ own knowledge as a thinking being as the fundamental form. From that point, 
other ideas that could not have entered the mind from experience but which must be innate, 
are reached. A modern-day linguist such as Noam Chomsky relies heavily on a reformulation 
of Cartesian principles [Chomsky 1983], and modern-day discussion of innateness in regard 
to language evolution has inherited many points and arguments.  
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 In the 17th century, philosopher Hume argued that nothing is in the mind that was not 
first in the senses [Hume 1978 (1739)], a position that came to be known as empiricism. A 
basic tenet of this philosophy is that our knowledge comes from sensory experiences of the 
world, and that more abstract ideas are created through association. This means that we do 
not have innate ideas but that our sensory apparatus is the connection between the individual 
and the world. As based on associations, the co-occurrence of phenomena, our knowledge of 
the world is based upon how we experience the world. While we conclude this is how the 
world works, this is an induction and as such, only correct until proven otherwise. In other 
words, we do not have access to underlying laws of nature as being anything but the regular 
occurrence of phenomena, as elaborated in his famous treatment of the concept of causality. 
This position has its modern counterpart in the behaviorist tradition in psychology and 
animal learning theory [Mackintosh 1974; Skinner 1974]. Concerning language evolution, it 
is found in arguments that the same principles are at play whether it is a human infant 
acquiring language, a rat learning to navigate a maze, or a wolf pup learning which food to 
eat. Regarding language acquisition, it means that trial-and-error learning could potentially 
make an ape acquire language, and for language evolution it means that no language 
acquisition device is necessary. 
Chomsky and modern linguistics 
 Reason played a central role in Descartes' philosophy, that has in many ways been 
taken over by language in Chomskian linguistics. Language in Chomsky’s sense has to be 
understood as an innate faculty. This language faculty is a "universal grammar", which 
makes it possible to learn and to produce the grammar of any particular language. The 
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language faculty is thereby the form that any particular language must conform to. 
Consequently, it is formal, universal, and innate and what defines humans as opposed to 
other animals, like Descartes’ reason[Chomsky 1983].  
 The understanding of what ‘universal’ means must be specified. For Chomsky, reason 
or intelligence is not universal. Other species might be better at certain tasks than humans, 
which is a matter of evolutionary specialization and adaptation. Language, too, is a faculty 
with a restricted domain. In a certain sense, language could be understood as universally 
human, in the sense of a species specific “universal grammar”, which is the absolute 
measurement of language. Chomsky argues that we must have an innate module in the brain, 
a grammar module, which makes humans capable of learning a specific language[Chomsky 
1984] . Underlying this is his view of the brain as modular: that the brain is composed of 
different modules, each with its specific purpose and working more or less independently of 
each other.  
 As evidence that humans must have this innate grammar module, Chomsky points to 
two features of language. First, the ease with which children acquire language and second, 
the apparent infinity of possible sentences that can be made out of a limited number of 
words. All over the world, children acquire language without formal instruction. The way 
children learn language seems to Chomsky not to be possible without an innate language 
faculty, as the environment could not possibly provide them with enough information and 
examples in order to understand and produce all the different arrangements of words found in 
language.  
 The other feature is infinity with finite means. Most sentences in spoken and written 
language are new combinations of words that have never been presented to the individual 
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ever before. If we did not have an innate faculty to produce and decode this infinity of new 
sentences according to a fixed grammar, it is difficult to see how the individual could 
possibly use language in such a flexible way. 
 These two features are at the core of Chomsky’s argument against the idea that 
mastering language is due to learning and cultural influences. Chomsky argues that 
behaviorism and other doctrines emphasizing learning must be on the wrong track, and that 
they cannot explain either how children acquire language or the flexible and innovative 
nature of language. In a Chomskian framework, the sole role of the environment is to turn the 
parameters of the innate language faculty in a certain way so as to facilitate the learning of a 
specific language; however it does not influence the form of the universal grammar itself. 
 Chomsky defines ‘universal grammar’ and ‘particular grammar’ in the following 
ways:  
 
- A theory of the language faculty is sometimes called universal grammar, adapting a 
traditional term to a research program somewhat differently conceived. Universal 
grammar attempts to formulate the principles that enter into the operation of the 
language faculty. The grammar of a particular language is an account of the state of 
the language faculty after it has been presented with data of experience; universal 
grammar is an account of the initial state of the language faculty before any 
experience [Chomsky 1995] 
  
 In this way, the language faculty is the basis for learning a language: it is a grammar 
module, pre-wiring the brain to learn any specific grammar of any particular language. The 
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principles of the workings of the language faculty are the universal grammar, which is the 
grammar that underlies all possible human languages. By being pure generative syntax, 
(generating the syntax necessary for the grammar of a specific language) the language 
module as a neural organ is without neural input. It is isolated from empirical factors and 
other cognitive domains, and language is therefore formalistic [Lakoff and Johnson 1999]. 
Therefore, language is separated from the environment. As formal syntax, language is 
deprived of any connection with environment, culture, the needs and benefits of 
communication, independent of bodily activities such as motion, perception etc. Language is 
also separated from other cognitive abilities as it is defined as an isolated brain organ, a 
specific ability.   
 According to Chomsky, the innate language faculty is not an evolutionary 
phenomenon. However, this question poses difficulties for Chomsky. He writes that the most 
probable answer is that it originated due to a mutation in the cells [Chomsky 1983]. 
Evolutionary theory is not the right way to address the question of the origin of language, as 
by its nature language seems not to be the kind of thing that would be subject to evolutionary 
pressure. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1999), the Chomskian denial of language as 
evolutionarily evolved is connected with his definition of language as syntax:  
 
- Moreover, “syntax” on this account could not have evolved through natural 
selection. Chomsky’s Cartesian perspective rules out such a possibility. If “syntax” is 
to characterize the essence of human nature, if it is to define what distinguishes 
human beings from the apes, then it could not have been present in any form in the 
apes. If “syntax” is to define the essence of human nature, it must come all at once, 
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by genetic mutation, not gradual selection. Chomskian “syntax” is not something that 
can be shared in part with our simian ancestors. That is why he so adamantly 
opposes the attribution to animals of any language capacity at all. He thus views the 
study of animal communication as irrelevant to any study of the language capacity 
[Lakoff and Johnson 1999] 
 This means that the Chomskian definition of language as syntax excludes evolution 
and this exclusion in part leads him to argue for a man-animal dualism. If language is not an 
evolutionary phenomenon, it is instead a uniquely human feature, which sharply 
distinguishes us from animals. Therefore the study of animals cannot teach us anything about 
the important part of the human mind: the language faculty. If language were seen as an 
evolutionary phenomenon, it would be much harder to deny the connection between animal 
language and human language. Contrary to this view, I argue throughout this dissertation, 
and specifically in chapters two and five, that this view runs into significant empirical and 
theoretical problems and further, that studies of apes are informative about human language 
and cognition.  For certain questions regarding language evolution, studies of nonhuman 
primate communication and their ability to acquire symbols present the only avenue we have 
Synthesis and new perspectives 
 The schism between rationalism and empiricism was addressed by Immanuel Kant 
[Kant 1974 (1787)]. Kant argued that the relativism inherent in empiricism could endanger 
our conceptions of true knowledge, scientific knowledge, and ultimately, moral truths. 
Rationalism, on the other hand, at least in the prevalent Cartesian form, ran the risk of 
circular arguments and unjustified metaphysical claims. Kant, instead, argued that while 
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empiricists are correct that our knowledge comes from the senses, rationalists are correct in 
assuming that the mind does contribute however, it is not in the form of innate ideas as the 
content of our thought. Rather, the mind provides form, such as time and space, to the 
sensory input. We cannot step outside the form imposed by the nature of our sensory 
apparatus and our mind, but we can acknowledge that this is the lens through which we 
perceive the world. He advocated a strict distinction between man and other species through 
the distinction in our reasoning capacities between "Verstand" and "Vernunft", roughly 
translating to "understanding" and "reason". Only humans possess the latter faculty, which 
allows for moral judgments and for examining the goals of our actions. When Kant was 
writing, Darwin had yet to put forward the theory of evolution. However, evolutionary 
psychology has, implicitly or explicitly, borrowed from Kant the idea of specific forms of 
perception through which the world is understood, as well as the idea that this form of 
apprehending the world is linked to our species. 
  Just as Kant aimed to unify rationalism and empiricism, realizing that both theories 
had shortcomings, so today there is a need to go beyond the innate-learned debate. I am by 
no means the first advocating this, but I will contribute with new perspectives based on the 
unique study subjects I have had the privilege of working with. The topics are intermingled, 
demanding both conceptual and empirical work encompassing several disciplines. I will 
present data from comparison between symbolically competent and non-symbolically 
competent bonobos in their abilities to categorize items and to acquire new symbolic 
relations, discuss the specific methodological and theoretical issues involved in this research, 
and discuss how the issue of language evolution can be seen from this perspective. 
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Appendix 1: Bonobo subjects' biographies.   
Current residence: Great Ape Trust of Iowa, Des Moines, Iowa. 
Previous residence: Language Research Center, Atlanta, Georgia. 
Kanzi: Born in 1980 at Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Atlanta, Georgia. Shortly 
after birth, he was adopted by Matata who has functioned as his mother. He moved to the 
Language Research Center with Matata for her participation in language research. He was 
around as scientists was attempted to teach Matata lexigrams. At the age of 2 1/2 years old, 
he was separated temporarily from Matata who returned to Yerkes for breeding purpose. At 
that point, he showed competence in the lexigrams and comprehension of spoken English. 
Since then, he was been a central subject of the bonobo language research, further developing 
his linguistic skills and . His life has been enriched through daily communication with 
humans regarding travelling in the forests, visiting other bonobo at the facility, and planning 
activities. This is the basis of his language skills.  
Panbanisha: Born in 1985 at the Language Research Center, Georigia, to Matata,  she was 
co-reared by humans and Matata. She had an adoptive sister, the common chimpanzee, 
Panpanzee, who was added to the experiment to investigate potential species differences. 
Matata functioned as the mother of both babies. They experienced an enriched life regulated 
by the use of lexigrams and spoken English, resembling Kanzi's. While Panpanzee was 
removed from the bonobo group as they grew older, Panbanisha has stayed with Matata, her 
brother Kanzi, and her own offsprings. She has continued to develop her language skills, and 
has participated in a long range of cognitive experiments. 
Matata: Wild-caught in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1970, she came to the 
Language Research Center in 1975 to participate in language research. While she did not 
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learn the lexigrams, despite hours of drilling, her adoptive son Kanzi and her daughter 
Panbanisha did. She lived until puberty in the Congolese jungle, and while she is now friends 
with the human scientists, her early rearing did not involve humans or language, and she is 
considered control group. She has participated in many cognitive experiments but is less 
human-oriented than her offsprings Kanzi and Panbanisha. Two of her offsprings, Elikya and 
Maisha, are also considered control group.  
Nyota: Born in 1998 at the Language Research Center, Nyota is the son of Panbanisha. He 
was co-reared by Panbanisha and humans as a baby, a time during which he was exposed to 
lexigrams and spoken language during everyday tasks. While ethnographic reports and 
everyday experience state that he comprehends spoken words and masters lexigrams, no 
scientific report has reported the degree of his language competencies. He does not have 
extensive experience with cognitive experiments but is very oriented toward social 
interaction with humans. 
Maisha: Born in 2000 at the Language Research center to Matata, Maisha is a member of the 
control group. He has not been exposed to lexigrams or spoken language and has lived a life 
more centered on bonobo interaction than interaction with humans. He does play with the 
human caretakers, though. There is no indication that he understands the lexigrams. 
Elikya: Born in 1997 at the Language Research Center to Matata, Elikya has as her mother 
and brother Maisha, primarily served as a control subject. Her life has in many ways similar 
to Maisha's. She has recently become interested in the lexigrams, but it seems more like 
interest than comprehension. She is very focused on the social interactions of the bonobos.  
 
 
30 
 
Appendix 2: Schematics of bonobo laboratory 
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Chapter 2: Taking Apes Seriously: A reply to the debate between 
Tomasello and Boesch 
Paper to be submitted to Journal of Comparative Psychology 
Janni Pedersen 
Abstract    
 The debate whether most profitably to study nonhuman apes, henceforth "apes", in 
the field or in captivity rests on questionable conceptions about the history of the two 
research traditions and on questionable notions such  as the idea of a species' natural 
environment. Exposing these assumptions lets us more readily examine the current evidence 
we have for early rearing influence on ape cognition and the measures currently taken in 
laboratories to address biases in the studies. Development is taking on a new meaning in 
evolutionary biology, which has not yet been incorporated thoroughly into primatology. 
Language plays a significant role in human cognition and in giving instructions to subjects 
when carrying out experiments. Comparative studies should address this issue, and 
primatology should have measures to take symbolic capacities into account. 
Introduction 
 Journal of Comparative Psychology saw a debate concerning the merits of field 
studies versus captive study of primates, primarily between the researchers Boesch and 
Tomasello. I argue that both sides of the debate miss some important issues, and that these 
issues are crucial for the way we conduct primate studies. In particular, the influence of 
symbolic capacities on cognition and on the conduct of experiments has been neglected. In 
arguing for the primacy of field studies, unfounded assumptions about how the research 
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traditions evolved, how captive experiments are conducted, and the notion of what entails a 
natural environment, are made. Examining these issues can contribute to a clarification of 
what field and captive studies can each contribute to our understanding of primates. 
Field or Captive Primate Studies? 
Taking Development Seriously 
 Boesch [Boesch 2007] discusses the challenges of cross-species cognitive 
comparisions, specifically of human and chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) cognitive abilities. 
Most direct comparisons of human and ape cognitive abilities are based on experimental 
studies of captive apes, but such experiments do not adequately address the issues of 
ecological variables and ontogenetic development, which means that the comparison with 
human cognition becomes biased. According to Boesch [Boesch 2007] captive and field 
studies of apes have been dominated by two different paradigms. Captive studies have 
emphasized species-specific behaviors, understanding behavior as largely determined by 
genes or specific brain modules. Housing conditions, according to Boesch, are impoverished 
but the researchers does not see that as posing an obstacle for cognitive studies as the 
ontogenetic development is not crucial. The skills in question would theoretically manifest 
themselves in any healthy member of the species during experimental tasks. This is in 
contrast to field studies, which have acknowledged populational differences and tried to 
understand cognitive abilities as evolved capacities under influence of social and ecological 
conditions. If Boesch is correct, apes studied in captivity are automatically at a disadvantage 
when compared to humans as a result of growing up in impoverished conditions. 
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 Boesch notes that the human subjects most often used in cognitive and experimental 
psychology as comparison with apes are White Middle-class Westerners (WMW). However 
this group of people does not represent the full range of human behavior and cognition 
present or past, which misrepresents and may mislead the cognitive experiments and 
subsequent comparisons.   
 In the testing situation, more biases appear. While humans have the advantage of 
being tested by other humans, apes are confronted with and tested by individuals of another 
species. Further, human infants often have a parent with them, which is rare for the ape 
subjects. Most importantly, the human infants have grown up in a more enriched 
environment than the apes, and if environment during development plays a crucial role for 
cognition, this creates an unequal comparison. Boesch (2007) does refer to certain captive 
ape studies such as those by the Japanese group led by Matsuzawa [Okamoto et al. 2002; 
Tomonaga et al. 2004] or the case of the bonobo Kanzi [Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin 
1994], which might be different in the way the apes are raised and tested. However this point 
is not elaborated. Rather, in the following debate [Boesch 2008] it becomes clear that the 
underlying issues are whether apes exhibit what he sees as the most impressive skills under 
captive or field conditions, and whether the behavioral and cognitive performance of a 
captive ape can be representative of the species. 
    The Need for Experimental Control 
 The reply by Tomasello and colleagues [Tomasello and Call 2008] states that while 
Boesch does put forward important points concerning both internal and external validity, 
many of the issues are already being addressed in the laboratories. The examples of 
impoverished conditions provided by Boesch are from the past, while he fails to take into 
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account the current housing conditions of apes. Captive studies are crucial because they 
allow for experimental control that field studies do not, thereby opening up the possibility of 
addressing questions not possible in the field. As Tomasello and Call (2008) put it, field 
studies tell us what chimpanzees do, but it is very difficult to get at precise cognitive 
mechanisms behind that behavior. Therefore, captive experiments are needed. Since the data 
do not show impoverished cognitive abilities in captive chimpanzees compared to wild 
chimpanzees, there is no reason not to conduct these studies
1
. Rather, experimental research 
has shown impressive cognitive abilities in captive chimpanzees. Since there is no systematic 
comparison of cognitive abilities in the field or in captivity, the question of which form of 
study reveals the most impressive abilities of chimpanzees, or other apes, cannot yet be 
answered. As for internal validity, Tomasello and Call (2008) argue that in their own lab, as 
in other labs, every effort is made to control for the difference in conditions between humans 
and apes, especially through the use of control conditions. This is to say, to statistically 
measure the difference for each species on a task, such as receiving help from an individual  
having seen food been hidden and an individual who had not, and then compare the trend of 
change across species. To the issue of a specific human group dominating the human 
subjects, Tomasello and Call acknowledges this could pose problems but they argue that 
most of their experiments are conducted with young infants who have not yet developed the 
specificities of their culture and language.  
                                                          
1
 Studies have indicated the presence of PTSD (post-traumatic-stress syndrome) in captive chimpanzees 
(Ferdowsian HR, Durham DL, Kimwele C, Kranendonk G, Otali E, Akugizibwe T, Mulcahy JB, Ajarova L, 
Johnson CM. 2011. Signs of Mood and Anxiety Disorders in Chimpanzees. PLos ONE 6(6).)  While PTSD 
could negatively impact the performance on cognitive tasks, there is no indication that captive chimpanzees in 
rich captive environments as a group suffer from PTSD. 
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The Validity of Captive Studies 
 Boesch [2008] replies by arguing that since the differences between growing up in an 
impoverished environment and a normally enriched environment do change cognition, 
cognitive differences between humans and apes, as well as between captive and free-living 
chimpanzees, would be expected. He maintains that to claim that we do not have evidence 
that wild apes have more sophisticated cognition than those in captivity is to ignore the last 
decades of research from important field sites. The need for studying the influence of 
development and ecology on cognition is reiterated by Boesch, while he ends this part of the 
debate by adding that even though captive chimpanzees are not representative of the species, 
well-conducted experiments can be enlightening. The debate of the validity of captive 
studies, in particular the issue of testing apes with a human experimenter, continues, with 
similar arguments [De Waal et al. 2008; Herrmann et al. 2008]. This debate has been 
referenced in a range of papers, boiling down to the issue of  methodology [Bard et al. ; 
Burghardt 2009; Jaeggi et al. ; Leavens and Racine 2009; van Schaik and Burkart]. However, 
I will argue that some unjustified assumptions are made and important issues are overlooked. 
The first problem lies with the notion of a species and its natural environment. 
A New Look at the Debate 
The Natural Environment 
 The first issue raised by this debate is what constitutes a natural environment. For 
Boesch, a captive chimpanzee has been removed from its natural environment and an ape in 
captivity is ultimately an individual without the opportunity to develop appropriately and 
naturally. Tomasello's reply that apes in most contemporary laboratories are not deprived 
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socially or physically does not ultimately address the question of what constitutes a natural 
environment for an ape, if there is one. Apes, and other primate and nonprimate animals, are 
definitely affected by their environment in their behavior, both the immediate environment 
and the one experienced during ontogeny. However,  this does not mean that an individual of 
a species will change into something else if it lives in an environment not commonly 
experienced by that species. For instance, this means that e a chimpanzee growing up in a 
captive environment might exhibit behavioral changes compared to its conspecifics on the 
savannah in Senegal or the jungle of Tanzania. Rather, such a situation is an example of 
behavioral flexibility, exhibiting different behaviors under different circumstances [West-
Eberhard 2003] which may ultimately lead to evolved changes under a form of the Baldwin 
effect [Laland 2003]. A hypothetical example of the Baldwin effect would be a specific 
sequence of a bird song, that was first learned. Some individuals had an easier time learning 
it, and they would produce the song faster and more reliably, attracting more mates. After 
some generations, the behavior would have a stronger genetic component, which means that 
less learning would be needed. Boesch might agree to this as long as the environment falls 
under what he would define as a natural environment. Captivity is not an environment under 
that category, however, and therefore not appropriate for a chimpanzee. The problems with 
this position might be illustrated by applying it consistently to humans. 
 The group of humans used as subjects in cognitive psychology consists of mainly 
WMW, who live in houses, drive cars, eat processed food, make extensive use of human-
invented technology, and go through an extensive educational system. This would imply that, 
following the argument of Boesch, that not only are WMW not representative of the human 
race, they could be a particularly unrepresentative and perhaps even deviant example of the 
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cognition of Homo sapiens. The highly technological and sheltered environment of the 
WMW, far from the environment in which our species lived and evolved both 10,000 years 
ago and 2 mya., as well as different from the conditions of  many of the world's population 
today, would make WMW as derived and uncharacteristic of its species as a captive 
chimpanzee. Consequently, if we wish to maintain that WMW are exemplars of Homo 
sapiens, and as such, exhibit the cognition of a group of Homo sapiens in a specific 
environment, it is not clear which ape population, if any, would be the most suitable 
comparison. Boesch does mention that human groups living as hunter-gatherers in forested 
habitats would be the most suitable for comparison with contemporary apes [Boesch 2008], 
though the point is not emphasized. Neither is it clear how those humans would compare 
with apes growing up in an enriched captive setting, It is inconsistent to maintain that WMW 
are valid exemplars of Homo sapiens, while arguing that captive apes, even in socially rich 
environments, are less representative of their species. 
 The view that an animal species has a stereotypical natural environment entails a 
static view of the relationship between individual and environment. That relationship, 
however, is instead a dynamic interaction in which the individual is an active agent. An 
organism changes its environment through its biological functions, thereby constructing a 
new niche for its offspring [OdlingSmee et al. 1996]. While the evolutionary significance of 
the changed environment due to niche construction is currently debated [Laland et al. 1999], 
it is significant for the current debate that an ape does not live in a static environment but a 
changing environment in which the ape itself contributes to the changes, both through 
behavior and other biological functions. When maintaining that organisms interact with and 
alter their environment, the question of a natural environment appears less meaningful, and it 
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becomes clear that we cannot determine a priori what constitutes an appropriate environment 
for a species. Therefore, it becomes questionable why, without specific evidence to support 
the claim, apes are more properly studied in some environments than others.  
Determinism and Speciesism 
 Contemporary primate studies in captivity or in the field developed from different 
though interacting and overlapping research traditions. Two important influences were 
behaviorism in psychology and ethology in the field of animal behavior. A closer look at 
these traditions as well as the current state of research conducted in the field or in the 
laboratory makes it dubious that Boesch's claims of deterministic, species-centered captive 
research versus dynamic field research based on population differences and development are 
accurate.   
 Behaviorism was an attempt to avoid anthropomorphism in research with animals 
and, more generally, avoid mental terms that the methods and theories of the time could not 
address properly. In Skinner's (1974) version, behaviorism advocates focusing on observable 
behavior without reference to other cognitive processes than stimulus-response patterns. This 
implies that learning processes are the same across species and consequently, focusing on 
specialized brain modules or species-specific behavior is not part of the research program. 
Note that in the Skinnerian version, behaviorism is less a cautious methodological 
commitment than an actual ontological commitment to the state of human and nonhuman 
animal minds.  
 The case of language may serve as example of how Skinnerian behaviorism views 
behavior. Examining what has often been conceived as the ultimate human achievement, 
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Skinner (1957, 1986) sought to explain language as based on the same learning process as 
any other behavior, the specific species not mattering much. The only species difference 
found here is vocal behavior coming under operant control in humans, in contrast to 
nonhuman primates. Concerning determinism, this approach emphasizes that an individual is 
malleable due to environmental occurrences and less determined by its genetic heritage than 
the specific conditioning it has experienced.  
 Behaviorism did not remain the main paradigm in experimental psychology. As new 
methods and theories emerged, researchers began addressing the mental workings of the 
mind, under the name of cognition. The cognitive revolution in psychology was first applied 
to humans and, later, to nonhuman primates. This means that mental terms that a few decades 
ago were not applied to nonhuman primates are today more frequently used, as researchers 
now study them. 
 Behavioral ecology emerged from Tinbergen's ethology and the four famous 
questions that ecology should address [Tinbergen 1951 (1969)]. Early ethology focused on 
proximate mechanisms and used the term "instincts" to signify inborn behavioral traits that 
would be activated by the environment. While this does signify development, it is a highly 
constrained and predetermined development. Tinbergen devoted a book to the causal study of 
innate behavior [Tinbergen 1951 (1969)], in which he emphasized ethograms as the total 
description of the behavior of a species, as well as the stimuli, which here are the releasing 
mechanisms in the environment.  
 The ecological approach to the study of nonhuman primates looked for ecological 
influences on behavior to a degree where the physical environment determines an 
individual's behavior (with exceptions). General relationships between environment and 
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behavior were sought, and differences between populations were not explained by behavioral 
flexibility but by ecological variables. One could even talk about a tendency to ecological 
determinism [Strier 2003; Strier 2007], that leaves little room for individual agency. This is 
to say, a change in the behavior of a group of primates must be explained by a change in the 
environment. Even as powerful quantitative tools started being used in the 1980's, ecological 
factors were often conceptualized as determining the behavior. Strier [Strier 2003] relates 
this trend to misunderstandings in connection with the advance of sociobiology. While this 
might be a valid assumption for some species, it is an assumption that might or might not be 
true of apes. With today's knowledge, ecological determinism does not seem warranted, and 
at the most, the research paradigm should not exclude other options. Only recently has the 
term 'culture" been revived in primatology and achieved a more general application and 
acceptance [Byrne et al. 2004; Laland 2008; O'Brien et al. 2003; van Schaik et al. 2003; van 
Schaik and Pradhan 2003], which means that researchers have found population differences 
not attributable to ecological factors.  
 It is worth noting that  both behaviorism and ecology shied away from ascribing 
mental terms to nonhuman animals due to fear of anthropomorphism and in search of 
scientific objectivity. In fact, for a long time both traditions were de facto behaviorists in this 
respect [Griffin 1976]. Ethology was, like behaviorism, not inclined to address mental terms 
and subjective experiences: "the ethologist does not want to deny the possible existence of 
subjective phenomena in animals, he claims that it is futile to present them as causes, since 
they cannot be observed by scientific methods" [Tinbergen 1951 (1969)]. Tinbergen 
acknowledges behaviorism as another form of the objective method he advocates but argues 
that psychology studies higher, learned behaviors, and not innate behaviors.  This has led to 
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neglect of the fact that the learned behaviors are mere modifications of the so-called innate 
behaviors. 
 Today, the cognitive revolution has spread to primate studies and so has the idea of 
local traditions, or cultural variation. To a large extent, much of the detailed knowledge we 
have today is based on a combination of field and captive studies, including observations and 
experiments [Cheney and Seyfarth 1992; Genty and Byrne 2010; Wheeler 2008; Wheeler 
2009; Whiten 2002]. There is, as argued by Tomasello and colleagues, a need for controlled 
experiments to assess cognitive processes, and, as argued by Boesch, a need for taking 
variation across populations into account. It would be premature and inconsistent to a priori 
determine what constitutes a valid population based upon the notion of a natural environment 
or the assumptions of a specific research traditions.  
 A significant part of this debate seems to rest on outdated views on the state of the 
research, especially in captivity and on where the two research traditions came from. By 
elucidating this, more productive collaboration could possibly be achieved and more 
interesting questions examined. However, two remaining issues, currently at the borderline of 
primatology, should also be included in our debate on how we conduct research with apes 
and compare them with humans. 
New Directions 
 The notion of a natural environment is biased and the view of the tradition of primate 
studies as falling into two distinct categories and captive studies being deterministic, 
reductionist, and species-centered, while field studies are dynamic and centered on ecology 
and development, does not correspond well with the actual developments in the traditions. 
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This makes it relevant to ask for the evidence of how care in captivity influences cognition 
and behavior. 
Development and Evolution   
 Ijzendoorn and colleagues [Ijzendoorn et al. 2009] conducted a longitudinal study of 
the difference between standard or responsive care of nursery reared chimpanzees at Yerkes 
Regional Primate Research Center. Results showed both emotional and cognitive differences 
between the two groups, and the researchers concluded that responsive care does enhance 
cognitive and emotional development in the first year of a chimpanzee's life. It is important 
to note that these were chimpanzee infants who had to be removed from their mother due to 
her inability to care for them. They would ordinarily have been raised by their mother and 
received responsive care from her, not from a human caretaker. While social deprivation 
does affect behavior, apes are not necessarily being raised in social isolation, on the contrary. 
The study also highlights how the issue is being addressed and investigated in captivity.  
 Another study by Pitman and Schumaker [2009] examined how early care affects 
joint attention. Their conclusion is that joint attention is a robust skill in all four species of 
great apes, and, in the first two years of life, likely not significantly influenced by standard 
care or more elaborate care, roughly meaning responsive care as understood in the previously 
mentioned study by Ijendoorn et al.  
 A recent study by Brosnan and colleagues illustrates how experiments can be 
designed to address the differences in testing situations between apes and humans  
[Brosnan et al. 2011]. They used the Assurance game (stag hunt), which looks at whether 
individuals will cooperate for a large reward that they will only receive if the other 
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individuals also choose to cooperate. The researchers aimed to make the conditions more 
equal for the chimpanzees and the humans, which meant that the setup employed for the 
chimpanzees also became the default for the human subjects. The results indicated some 
species differences but also a significant amount of individual intraspecific variation for both 
humans and chimpanzees. Equalizing experimental setup made for a more even comparison, 
where the humans were less advantaged in knowing the mechanics and purpose of the task.  
The verbal instructions to the humans were limited and thereby, the researchers addressed the 
issue of instructions to humans through language, an issue to which I will return below. 
Although these are more recent studies that Boesch and Tomasello could not have taken into 
account, they do signify that the issues raised are being addressed. The results are startling, 
providing new information about both methodology for the cognitive comparison between 
humans and apes, as well as the cognitive differences and similarities between the two 
species. It is difficult to see how similar studies could have been carried out as field studies 
and it illustrates how captive studies do contribute information that could not be obtained in 
the field. 
 It is also crucial to note that development is taking on a new importance for 
evolutionary biology, in particular in the form of evo-devo. In this line of work, the old view 
of phenotype being environment plus genotype must be revised. Environment can have 
evolutionary consequences [West-Eberhard 1989; West-Eberhard 2003]. With a slightly 
different perspective, Jablonka and colleagues argue that behavioral innovations can lead to 
evolutionary change, part of their argument being a modified version of the Baldwin effect 
[Avital and Jablonka 2000; Jablonka and Lamb 2005]. These ideas, still not mainstream 
thoughts in evolutionary biology, should initiate a similar trajectory in primatology. 
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Primatology needs to look at how evolution might act on developmental pathways and not 
merely the adult individual. The topic of ape cultures and behavioral tradition have been 
widely debated [Byrne et al. 2004; van Schaik et al. 2003; Whiten and van Schaik 2007] but 
little, if any, attention has been paid to how change in behavior might influence subsequent 
evolution. A richer explanatory framework, and a framework more in accordance with the 
development of modern evolutionary biology, has the potential to move primatology beyond 
the dichotomous discussions referenced above. 
Symbolic Communication and Cognition 
 Neither Boesch nor Tomasello mentions the role language plays in experimental 
setup and, possibly, in cognition. However, verbal instructions could play a very significant 
role that creates an additional bias between human and ape subjects. Further, symbolic 
language may influence other cognitive operations, and while it is not a factor we can easily 
control for (or maybe even should control for), certain captive studies have the potential to 
address that question.  Instructions to human subjects are often given through language, and 
this cannot be done with apes, at least not with the majority of apes, be it captive or field 
experiments. This can be addressed by minimizing the verbal instructions to humans, such as 
Brosnan and colleagues did [2011].  
 Language is more than a medium for giving instructions, however. Symbolic 
language might have an influence on other cognitive operations, as it has been taken to define 
our humanness and to influence our thought processes. The famous Saphir-Whorf hypothesis 
holds that language determines our thoughts in the sense that people speaking different  
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languages may perceive and  think of the world in different ways. This position became less 
prominent in linguistics as Chomskian linguistics with its focus on a specialized language 
module came to dominate thoughts on language [Chomsky 1983], but researchers have 
continued to investigate how different languages influence cognition. What cannot be 
addressed with humans (due to ethical reasons) is the effect of the presence or absence of 
symbolic language on cognition. 
 The assumed influence of symbols on cognition in general means that apes without 
documented symbolic capabilities might, at least in some experiments, be at a disadvantage 
compared to humans due to the mere presence of symbolic language in humans and its 
influence on the cognitive operations investigated. While there might be a situation that it is 
not always relevant to correct, as both species evolved their own system of communication, 
there are both situations where it is relevant for the comparison between the two species and 
situations where it allows for addressing the question of what symbols do to the cognition of 
an organism. This cannot be addressed with humans, as all healthy humans develop 
language, and individuals deprived of language exposure have also been deprived of a range 
of other social stimuli. 
 Symbolically competent apes do exist, and it can be instructive to examine how they 
perform on tests in contrast to non-symbolically competent apes. The bonobos, Kanzi, 
Panbanisha, and their family, at the Great Ape Trust of Iowa, previously at the Language 
Research Center, Atlanta, Georgia, present an opportunity to address these questions. 
Through early immersion into a bi-species language-enriched environment, these individuals 
acquired comprehension of spoken English and productive abilities through pointing to 
symbols on a lexigram board [Savage-Rumbaugh and Fields 2000; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 
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1993; Segerdahl et al. 2005]. For the current debate regarding cognitive comparison, the 
issue is what these apes’ symbolic capacities mean for other cognitive abilities and, 
specifically, those that have been compared with humans. For example, two studies have 
looked at the issue of pointing behavior in these bonobos, which has been argued by 
Tomasello [Tomasello 2006] to separate humans and apes. A study comparing linguistically 
enriched chimpanzees and bonobos [Lyn et al. 2010] argues that these apes outperform other 
apes in comprehension of pointing. Another study has argued that when looking for a 
linguistically mediated behavior, or cognitive operation, such as declarative pointing, the 
relevant apes for comparison are those that have used and comprehended pointing in these 
interactions [Pedersen et al. 2009]. Even young infants, argued by Tomasello to be pre-
linguistic, already comprehend a range of words, and interact with parents who point while 
talking to them. Therefore, by not taking into account the influence of symbolic 
enculturation, the comparison in this case favors the human children. Comparison with 
symbolically competent apes revises what was seen as a species difference, and it is 
important to note that this issue can only be addressed by studying apes in captivity and 
systematically addressing issues of early ontogeny.  
Conclusion 
 Speciesism and deterministic behavioral categories tend to emerge even when we aim 
to avoid them. The debate concerning whether to study apes in captivity or under field 
conditions and how to compare ape cognition with human cognition reveals the 
pervasiveness of the conceptions of what it means to be a human, what it means to be an ape, 
and consequently, how the two species can be studied. But examining the notion of the 
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natural environment and the research traditions leading to modern day primatology in field or 
laboratory settings, respectively, makes it clear that neither tradition can claim to have been 
free of biased assumptions or methodology. This also means that neither tradition can claim 
to study apes more as they "really" are than the other, that both fields can contribute to 
primatology in general and to comparative cognition in particular. When these theoretical 
and methodological obstacles have been addressed, we can study how different rearing 
conditions affect cognition, which is already a growing interest for laboratory primatologists.   
 Ontogenetic development is currently gaining status as a factor that implies not 
merely expressing the genetic code, but rather as an active contributor to the evolutionary 
process. When Boesch suggests taking development seriously, he does not clarify what he 
means. He seems to conceive of development as a simple maturation process, requiring only 
a non-deprived environment. While mentally and physically healthy environments for apes in 
captivity are very much part of an ongoing process, it is also true that neither housing 
conditions nor experiments are comparable to the situation a decade or more ago. Such 
changes mean that many of the issues raised by Boesch have already been addressed, or are 
being continuously worked on by the scientists. However, Tomasello does too readily 
dismiss the issue of comparing human children and apes, though less so for the reasons raised 
by Boesch than for the reason of language. Language pervades every aspect of our lives and, 
in the case of cognitive experimentation, children are already being influenced by burgeoning 
linguistic abilities. Our best approach currently to study how symbols and language influence 
an individual are the symbolically-competent apes. There is an interaction between language 
and thought, and while we know something about how different languages influence how 
people are prone to think and conceive of problems [Bialystok 2007], we do not know much 
48 
 
about what differentiates an organism with language from the same organism without 
language.  However, we have a way of approaching that issue, through apes with symbolic 
abilities. While it is not feasible (or necessary) to conduct a majority of cognitive 
experiments with symbolically competent apes, it is feasible to use the research program(s) 
and apes that are here to test specific hypotheses, and as a corrective to assumptions made 
and methods used. 
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Chapter 3. The Effect of Symbols on Categorization in Bonobos 
Paper to be submitted to International Journal of Primatology 
Janni Pedersen 
Abstract 
 In this study, I examined whether bonobos, Pan paniscus, competent with a symbolic 
mode of communication (lexigrams and spoken English) outperform non-symbolically 
competent bonobos in placing items into natural categories. The setup was a computerized 
match-to-sample test, and post - and pre-tests were administered to account for differences in 
experimental experience as well as to verify symbolic competence. Differences were 
significant and could not be explained by previous experience or maturity but by symbolic 
competence. This has important implications for how we perceive the relationship between 
language and other areas of cognition, which is a topic notoriously difficult to address in 
humans. The results suggest that neither strong versions of the Saphir-Whorf hypothesis 
strong versions of "language of thought" hypothesis are adequate descriptions of how 
symbols affect cognition.  
Introduction 
 Categorization is as a central feature of human cognitive operations. It allows humans 
(as well as nonhuman species) to subsume individual exemplars under a general category and 
thereby make predictions based on general features of the category. Nonhuman animals are 
able to categorize, though there is debate as to which species perform which kind or level of 
categorization, such as perceptual, same-different, or conceptual [D'Amato et al. 1986; 
Edwards et al. 1983; Nicholls et al. 2011; Thompson and Flemming 2008; Thompson and 
52 
 
Oden 2000; Wasserman and Young 2010].  Categorization is thought to be central to 
cognitive operations such as deduction and induction. Importantly, in humans categories are 
intimately linked to language [Medin and Rips 2005], though there are several suggestions as 
to what the specific nature of this relationship is. I aim to better understand the relationship 
between symbols and natural categories by examining the difference in performance between 
symbolically competent and non-symbolically competent bonobos, Pan paniscus, on a 
computerized three-choice match-to-sample test. By "natural categories", I mean a category 
consisting of items encountered by the individual in their world. 
 Categorization can be defined as a process that subsumes things according to an 
overarching feature. "Typically in cognitive psychology, categorization is regarded as a 
process of determining what things belong together and a category is a group or class of 
stimuli that so cohere. A concept is thought to be knowledge that facilitates the 
categorization process” [Zentall et al. 2002]. According to this definition, concepts facilitate 
the categorization process. Symbols can be seen as externalizing a concept as a 
representation for a category, though the relationship might not be a one-to-one mapping.  
 Theories of how language and thought relate can be divided according to a rough 
schema. The first group of theories claims a high interdependence between language and 
thought, with language often being seen as a prerequisite for thought, or at least anything that 
would resemble human thought [Donaldson 1990 (1975)]. This position would be supported 
by differences in cognition across cultures, in that it is a short move to argue that which 
specific language you speak determines what and how you think, the linguistic relativity 
hypothesis [Hunt and Agnoli 1991; Lucy 1992; Slobin 2003]. Most extreme is Fodor's claim 
of a language of thought, consisting of fifty thousand plus innate concepts [Fodor 1975].  
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 In the second group of theories, language is thought to be due to a highly developed 
capacity that does not rely upon other cognitive functions [Chomsky 1979; Chomsky 1983]. 
Chomsky, arguing for an isolated language module, proposes as support that the fundament 
of language is not symbols, concepts, and semantics, but grammar understood as a universal 
syntax that underlies the surface syntax of all languages. Language is what makes humans 
special, but it does not significantly affect thinking. 
 Following recent research, I will grant that while language depends upon concepts 
and categories, the reverse is not true; concepts and categories without language are possible 
[Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Mandler 2004; Mandler 2007]. This is the position most in 
accordance with nonhuman primate research [Marler 1982; Seyfarth and Cheney 2003; 
Slocombe and Zuberbuhler 2005], studies of human infants [Liszkowski et al. 2007], and of 
adult human reasoning [Lakoff and Johnson 1999]. Research with great apes has shown their 
ability to categorize in a number of ways. For the current study, it is relevant to emphasize 
the finding by Premack [1976] that plastic tokens, standing for a category, help a chimpanzee 
in categorization tasks. However, Premack studied same-different categorization and not 
natural categories. This is to say, his Chimpanzee Sarah used the plastic tokens to signify if 
two items were the same or different, not whether a group of objects belong to the same 
category. Rhesus monkeys taught symbols (letters) to stand for numbers have been shown to 
perform better at estimating quantities, signified by dots on a computer screen, than those not 
taught symbols [Livingstone et al. 2010], which mirrors findings by Boysen and Hallberg 
[2001] that chimpanzees are better able to choose the correct quantity, rather than merely the 
largest, if they have a symbol representing the quantity. A further indication of the 
importance of symbols for cognitive tasks concerns categorization of colors [Matsuno et al. 
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2006]. Chimpanzees trained to communicate with each other using graphic symbols, the 
same lexigrams as used by the bonobos in this study, were able to not only categorize objects 
appropriately using the symbols, but also to categorize the symbols appropriately as 
subsumed under each other. This is to say, lower-level symbols "hammer" and "key" would 
be categorized as belonging under the higher level category "tool" [Savage-Rumbaugh 1986]. 
This was argued to constitute real symbolic comprehension in contrast to a reinforced 
association of symbol and referent [Savage-Rumbaugh 1986]. 
 Apes form natural categories and are capable of forming higher-level categories 
without symbol training [Vonk and MacDonald 2002; Vonk and MacDonald 2004]. A study 
of categorization in infant chimpanzees by Murai [Murai et al. 2005] showed that a 
familiarization paradigm caused the infants to develop global categories. In human children, 
categories get more refined and specific as language develops, which is argued to be a sign 
that children already possess the concepts necessary for language to start developing around 
9 months of age [Mandler 2004]. This is a further indication of the existence of pre- or 
nonlinguistic concepts, and of an interaction, but not determination, between language and 
thought in the domain of categorization. 
 The current research does not indicate whether the mastery of symbols aids apes in 
the categorization of natural categories. Research into that issue could contribute to our 
understanding of the relationship between language and thought. For obvious ethical reasons, 
it is impossible to deprive a human infant of exposure to anguage. All humans develop 
language and therefore, have symbols to assign to categories. Those who do not develop 
language have either suffered severe social deprivation or a serious pathological condition. 
This means that our chances of studying and comparing an organism performing 
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categorization with or without a symbol are limited when restricting ourselves to Homo 
sapiens. However, symbolically competent apes do exist, and comparison between them and 
apes without symbolic competence lends empirical and evolutionary input to a discussion 
that is fundamentally philosophical, but which would benefit from taking place on an 
empirical basis. Further, this can help in creating evolutionary scenarios concerning language 
evolution and cognitive evolution.  
Methods 
Subjects 
 The subjects of this study were five bonobos, residing at the Great Ape Trust of Iowa, 
Des Moines. Two of these, Kanzi and Panbanisha, are well known for their symbolic 
competencies, which include comprehension of spoken English and the use of graphic 
symbols, lexigrams, to communicate with humans  [Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 2004; Savage-
Rumbaugh et al. 2005; Segerdahl et al. 2005]. Kanzi is an adult male, born in captivity in 
1980, while Panbanisha is an adult female, born in captivity in 1985. Their linguistic 
competencies developed as a result of early exposure to a language-enriched environment, 
and their comprehension of spoken English sentences are at least at the level of a 2 1/2 year 
old human infant [Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1993]. Their abilities include participating in 
conversations, taking turns, and maintaining topic appropriately [Benson et al. 2002; 
Pedersen and Fields 2008].  
 The control group consisted of Matata, an adult female who was wild caught and 
likely born in the late 1960s. Her son Maisha was born in captivity in 2000. Nyota, born in 
captivity in 1998, is the son of Panbanisha. While previous ethnographic rapports have 
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indicated that Nyota comprehends and uses symbols to communicate with humans, the test 
administered in this study classified him on par with the control group in comprehension of 
lexigrams and English words. This will be discussed in later sections. Efforts were made to 
include Matata's daughter Elikya, but despite many efforts to motivate her, she refused to 
participate in the experiments and was dropped from the study.  
 The apes are socially housed, with regulated access to large, outdoor enclosures in the 
warm months and ample space inside. The caretakers work to provide the optimal housing 
arrangements for the apes, meaning that the social groups are shifted depending upon the 
apes’ moods (e.g., to prevent aggression), research programs, and behaviorally or 
linguistically (lexigram) expressed wishes of the apes. The apes are rarely all together at the 
same time, which is similar to the fission-fusion system of most wild chimpanzees and to 
some extent bonobos.  
 The research station, consisting of a touch screen mounted on a platform, is accessed 
through a large enclosure in the middle of the building named the green house, where the 
apes will sometimes spend the day. From there, they separate to enter the room containing 
the research station (Figure 1). 
Procedure 
 The experiments were conducted using a touch screen (88.8 x 50 cm, 101.5 cm 
diagonally) connected to either a Macintosh or a Windows computer. The use of the two 
computers was due to the use of two different software programs, with the same visual 
interface for the apes and the same data reported. The software was written by associates of 
the laboratory, Ben Thompson and Kenneth Schweller (Buena Vista University), on a Mac 
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and a Windows platform, respectively. The ape entered the room and positioned herself or 
himself on the platform to initiate experimentation.  The human experimenter was in an 
adjacent room separated by a glass wall but able to hear the sounds associated with the 
experiment (Figure 1). Rewards were distributed through a small dispenser and consisted of 
pieces of fruit, M&M candies, peanuts, grapes and other food items depending upon requests 
by the ape but in accordance with dietary restrictions.  
 The testing procedure used was a delayed match-to-sample. In the version employed 
here, the sample stimuli appeared in the center quadrant of the screen. The ape touched it to 
acknowledge having seen it, and it then disappeared, giving way to the distracters (the 
incorrect choices) and the target (the correct choice).  To begin testing, the ape would press a 
green dot on the screen and the session would begin. The screen was divided into a 3x3 grid 
with the initial stimuli always appearing in the middle square, and the distracters and the 
target appearing randomly in the other squares (Figure 1).  
 
Fig.1. Kanzi working a categorization match-to-sample task. The middle square is where the stimuli 
would appear. Here he is studying the two distracters and the target. 
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Training Phase 
 The bonobo participants in this study possess different levels of familiarity with 
experimentation, including very different degrees of experience with a computerized match-
to-sample task. Kanzi and Panbanisha are highly sophisticated individuals who have 
participated in cognitive experiments throughout their lives [Benson et al. 2004; Lyn et al. 
2011; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1988; Schick et al. 1999; Taglialatela et al. 2003]. In contrast, 
Maisha has not yet had extensive experience with touch screens or cognitive experiments. 
Therefore, each bonobo went through a phase familiarizing them with this procedure. It 
consisted of an identity match-to-sample task. The stimuli were graphic images generated 
based on fractal equations using the software Tierazon.  
 Three sets of 50 stimuli were used, totaling 150 images in all. To ensure that the 
images were easy to distinguish, a surplus of images was generated and randomly sorted into 
three sets. Three persons examined the sets to remove those that resembled each other to a 
degree where they could be confused. The result was three sets of 50 images each. 
 The bonobos needed to reach criterion on each set of pictures, which was set to be 
above chance. With 1/3 probability of correct choice by chance in each trial, and 50 trials in 
each session, criterion  was set at 44% , 22 trials, correct (1/3 probability, N=50, N correct = 
22,  P= 0.03318). After reaching criterion on the first set of pictures, the bonobos could move 
on to the next set of stimuli. This was repeated with the three sets of stimuli, after which the 
bonobo was presented with a fourth task consisting of randomized pictures from the three 
sets.  This task also served as a baseline for the categorical matching task in that it allowed 
for separating experience and ability in experimental tasks in general from the categorical 
matching ability by comparing performance on the two tasks.  
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Fig. 2. Two examples of the graphic images used as stimuli. 
 
Assessing Symbolic Competencies 
 The symbolic competencies of Kanzi and Panbanisha have been documented 
extensively elsewhere [Savage-Rumbaugh and Fields 2000; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 2001; 
Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1993]. In contrast, the researchers did not succeed in teaching 
lexigrams to Matata, likely due to her age when the project began [Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 
1998]. However, Maisha's or Nyota's abilities have never been thoroughly tested, and 
Matata's abilities have not been empirically assessed recently. The lack of a formal 
assessment of their skills makes a comparison of their symbolic competencies and 
subsequent comparison of performance on other tasks based on symbolic competencies 
difficult. This comparison is needed for assessing the influence of symbolic competencies on 
categorization. Therefore, I conducted a test of their comprehension of lexigrams and spoken 
English words. The test was formatted as a computerized match-to-sample test resembling 
the other tests in this study. This does not imply that language skills or symbolic skills can be 
reduced to merely finding the right item when presented with a symbol. However, this ability 
is a foundation of other more advanced linguistic skills. I assumed that if bonobos do not 
master the reference relation, they would not be able to exhibit other linguistic skills, such as 
using words or lexigrams in conversations or to refer to new items. The test, therefore, is a 
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proxy for the symbolic and linguistic skills that Kanzi and Panbanisha exhibit. A high 
performance on this test does not guarantee ability to use the lexigrams in conversations, but 
a low performance makes it highly unlikely that the individual will use words and lexigrams 
spontaneously in conversation. Though, as will be discussed later, the case of Nyota may 
pose a conundrum for this assumption that it is outside the scope of this study to resolve. 
 Three tests were conducted. The first task required the ape to match a lexigram with 
the correct picture. The next test consisted of matching spoken English words to lexigrams, 
and the last test measured spoken words to picture. Each test was conducted twice, once each 
on two consecutive days with each subject. Each session consisted of 50 trials, three stimuli 
choices available in each trial.  The day before each test, the subject would be presented with 
a similar test using old pictures and old sounds drawn from the whole repertoire of words and 
lexigrams used with the apes on other tasks. This is to say, there is a stock of sounds and 
pictures used both in daily communication on the computerized keyboard and on different 
experimental tasks. Letting them practice on these stimuli was a way to help the apes 
understand with which  kind of test they would be presentedwith . 
 The photos and sounds for the testing condition were new, which means that new 
spoken words were recorded and new pictures were taken. The choice of words, lexigrams, 
and sounds had to meet several criteria. First, an effort was made to balance the kind of 
words and lexigrams tested. This means that categories were created, and that each test had 
to have an equal amount of words, lexigrams, or pictures from each category. Appendix 1 
provides the full list of words tested. The first two tests consisted of words not used in the 
other test, while the third test was an equal share of words from the first two tests. 
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 Only words on the lexigram board were used in the tests, and this provided some 
obstacles. Certain lexigrams do not lend themselves to being depicted in a manner easily 
recognizable in a photograph. Examples are "yellow", "good", or "later". This meant that 
they had to be excluded from use in this test. Verbs in general are difficult to depict. 
However, some verbs were depicted in a way that it was assumed would be recognizable by 
the bonobos, such as "tickle" and "bite".  This also explains why it was not possible to create 
three sets of 50 photos representing all different lexigrams, but that test number three had to 
consist of a mixture of pictures and lexigrams used in test one and test two. There simply 
were not enough lexigrams that were recognizable on a photograph and that would at the 
same time ensure variability, this is to say, not only representing one category of items. The 
third test was chosen as it ensured the most consistency: in the first two tests, all the 
lexigram/words were new, while in the third, they had all been seen before. If the second test 
had been chosen, it would have consisted of lexigram/words, half of which had already been 
experienced, half of which had not. Before the first of each test containing pictures, the 
bonobo subject was given the pictures, laminated, to look at as he or she pleased. This was to 
lessen the issue of novelty distracting the bonobo from focusing on the task.   
Categorical Matching Study 
 This task sought to assess the bonobos' abilities to match pictures of items with each 
other based on the item's membership of the same natural category. This is to say, the stimuli 
sample would have to be matched not to an identical copy of itself but to a match belonging 
to the same category. The categories chosen were "dog", "food", and "shoes". They were 
selected because the keboard used by the bonobos contain lexigrams for these categories, and 
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they represent items regularly encountered by the bonobos in their daily lives. In other words, 
they consist of items that will be either discussed using the keyboard, pointed to, or referred 
to using spoken words, during ordinary communicative interaction. 
              
Fig. 3. The lexigrams for the three categories tested 
 
 The procedure was to a large extent similar to the identity-matching task. This meant 
that there were three sets of stimuli, 50 pictures in each set, and 150 in all. Sessions consisted 
of 50 trials, presented on the touch screen, and each trial had three choices, which means that 
on average, the apes would perform at 33% correct by chance.  Forty-four percent correct (22 
trials correct) constituted a performance statistically significantly above chance. After 
reaching that criterion, the bonobo would move on to the next set of stimuli. 
 The three sets of stimuli consisted of photos taken by either the author or an intern in 
the laboratory. Photos were also found online at http://www.sxc.hu/. Most of those are in the 
public domain. Copyright was always respected.   
 
Fig. 4. Examples of pictures used as stimuli 
 
 It was sought to maintain random variation in each set of pictures. This included 
pictures of one or several dogs, pictures of a whole apple or apple slices, three shoes or one 
shoe, etc.  A main reason for maintaining random variation is that while it is possible to get a 
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clear photo of a single dog or one shoe, many food items do not lend themselves to being just 
"one". Drinks, pasta, salad, prepared dishes, sugar, etc. are normally not seen as "one" but as 
a quantity, e.g. a bowl of pasta, a bowl of cereal, or cut salad. Moreover, a clearer picture of 
fruits is often obtained if the fruit is cut, leaving two halves or one fruit plus a cut half. 
Therefore, to keep the bonobos from being able to create the category not "food" but 
"whatever looks different", I created random and non-predictable variation in photos 
belonging to each category. Aspects of variation included number and amounts of items in a 
picture, perspective, and colors. I decided to remove the background and have a uniform 
white or off-white background so as to not run the risk of the bonobos paying attention to 
some feature of the background and not the intended item. 
 Three people evaluated the photos as to whether they were unclear or ambiguous. 
Several photos were eliminated because it was not clear what the photo depicted. The photos 
were then randomly assigned to the three sets. These sets should represent the three 
categories equally. Because 50 is not divisible by 3 into a whole number, I used 17 photos of 
each category in each set. This means that each set consisted of 51 photos in each set that 
would be randomly chosen in sessions of 50 trials, which resulted in one category (randomly 
chosen) potentially occurring one time more frequently than the others. This was deemed 
preferable to the other solution, which would have been to reduce the number of photos in 
two categories by one and thereby ensuring some photos appearing more often than others. 
  A fourth task consisted of all 150 photos randomly chosen by the computer and 
presented to the bonobo in sessions of 50 trials. This was done to assure that learning 
processes other than categorization were not accountable for the results. 
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Ethical Note 
 This research was non-invasive, and the bonobos' participation was voluntary. The 
research was approved by Iowa State University and Great Ape Trust of Iowa IACUC 
(Pruetz 6740).  
Results 
 Data was analyzed using SAS 9.2. Microsoft Excel was also used for certain 
calculations. I first present the results of the linguistic baseline study, followed by the results 
of the identity-matching test, and finally the results of the categorical matching test. 
Symbolic Competencies 
 The initial test of the linguistic competencies confirmed largely the expectations that 
Kanzi and Panbanisha performed consistently above chance (between 57% and 90% correct), 
while Matata and Maisha did not (one session at 44%, the rest below).  
 
Fig. 5 Performance in terms of percentage correct for tests of symbolic competence. A is lexigram-to-
picture, B is spoken word to lexigram, and C is spoken word to picture. 
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 Nyota's performance was unexpected. He did not perform above chance, except on 
one session, which does not correspond to the impression of how he interacts with humans in 
daily life. While his performance might be due to the character of this test, for all subsequent 
analysis, he was included with Matata and Maisha as part of the non-symbolically competent 
group. As a control, the results of the categorization-matching task were analyzed both 
including and excluding Nyota, and his inclusion or exclusion did not qualitatively alter the 
conclusions. 
 A generalized linear mixed model was used to test for difference between the two 
groups. The difference in performance between the two groups was significant, (T= - 5.57, 
df=3, P=0.014).  The form of test itself (lexigram-to-picture, word-to-lexigram, and word-to-
picture, A, B, and C respectively in Figure 5) did not influence performance of the apes 
(F=0.6334, df=2, P=0.6334). The model corrected for multiple measurements and treated the 
results as a binominal random variable. The proportional difference (estimate logit=-1.6966) 
signified that Kanzi and Panbanisha were 5.56 times more likely to respond correctly to any 
trial than the other bonobos. 
Identity Matching 
 The performance on the identity-matching test did not follow the results of the 
symbolic competence test, though there were clear individual differences. A generalized 
linear mixed model showed no significant difference in performance based on linguistic 
training (T=1.73, df=1, P=0.1829) or according to the stimuli set (T,0.4177, df=3, P=0.4234). 
The model was the same as the model used for analyzing the results above but was corrected 
to treat the number of trials as a geometric random variable. 
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Fig. 6 Performance on identity matching task 
 
 A visual inspection of Figure 6 indicates that while Matata and Kanzi perform at 
almost the same level, and Nyota and Panbanisha perform similarly, Maisha is an outlier. He 
needs more sessions to reach criterion and has a low average percentage correct with much 
variability.  
Categorical matching 
 The data from the categorical matching task was analyzed using the same model as 
used above. The performance in terms of percentage correct on first and last trials is also 
included below in figure 7 in that it allows to discuss transfer of learning. 
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    Kanzi Panbanisha Matata Maisha Nyota 
Categorical 
Matching 1 
Number of 
sessions 1 1 5 8 3 
  
% Correct 
first trial 50 52 34 34 26 
  
% correct  
last trial 50 52 56 46 44 
Categorical 
Matching 2 
Number of 
sessions 1 1 6 6 5 
  
% Correct 
first trial 50 52 38 34 26 
  
% correct  
last trial 50 52 54 46 44 
Categorical 
Matching 3 
Number of 
sessions 1 4 2 7 3 
  
% Correct 
first trial 52 42 42 38 42 
  
% correct  
last trial 52 54 50 48 50 
Categorical 
Matching 4 
(mix of C1-C3) 
Number of 
sessions 1 3 8 6 2 
  
% Correct 
first trial 58 34 34 32 36 
  
% correct  
last trial 58 48 50 44 50 
Fig. 7. Performance on the categorical matching tasks. Categorical Matching 1-3 refer to the three 
sets of picture stimuli 
 
 There was a significant difference in number of sessions needed to reach criterion 
between the symbolically competent apes and the non-symbolically competent apes (T = 
4.09,df=1, P=0.0264), while the set of stimuli did not explain the difference (T=2.10, df= 3, , 
P=0.9795).  
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Fig. 8 Average individual performance on categorical matching tasks, including number correct out of 
50, and number of sessions needed to reach criterion. 
 
 The proportional difference between the two groups (1.0754, log-transformed) 
showed that the symbolically competent apes were three times as likely to respond correctly 
to a trial than the other group.  To account for any possible discrepancy between Nyota's 
performance on the symbolic competence test and the previous reports of his ability to 
interact using symbols, the data was analyzed excluding Nyota.  Excluding him did not 
change the significance of the results (P=0.0426). I therefore decided to continue including 
Nyota with Maisha and Matata for the purpose of this analysis.  
 A chi-square test was conducted for any differences in whether one of the categories 
was being answered correctly more often than the others. The results differed between the 
individuals. There was no difference for Kanzi X
2 
(2, N=6) = p= 0.3007) while Panbanisha 
choose the category "food" less often than predicted but the dog pictures more often than 
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predicted X
2 
= 63.958, df=3, P<0.01.  Maisha performed lower on shoe pictures and higher 
on food pictures than expected by chance, X
2
 = 42.79.57, df=2 P<0.01. Matata performed 
lower on shoe pictures than on the other categories, X
2 
= 40.9, df=2, P<0.01. Nyota was less 
likely to choose correctly when presented with a picture of a shoe than when presented with 
one of a dog or of food, X
2
 = 59.13, df=2, P<0.01. 
Discussion 
The influence of symbols on thought 
 This research indicates that the possession of a symbol aids an organism in 
categorizing items. It also suggests that while a symbol makes the learning and retention of a 
category faster, categorization is not an ability that depends upon language or the capacity for 
symbolic communication. While the previously documented ability of other primate and 
nonprimate species to categorize items and pictures of items has already made this statement 
clear [Thompson and Oden 2000; Vauclair 2002], my study used not abstract categories but 
actual items, and the categories were deliberately chosen to correspond to lexigrams and 
words understood and used by the bonobos. This allows me to address the relationship 
between symbols and categories. The strong difference between the two groups of bonobos 
in the categorization task in this study indicates a connection between the possession of 
symbols  and other cognitive processes involved in categorization. We see in figure 7 and 
figure 8 how the difference is visible both in terms of number of sessions to reach criterion 
and in terms of transferring learning from one set of stimuli to another set. Kanzi and 
Panbanisha maintain performance on 50 and 52 percent respectively on stimuli set 1 and 2, 
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while Matata's performance drop from 56 % to 38 % when shifting from stimuli set 1 to 
stimuli set 2. The same pattern is seen for Nyota and Maisha. 
 The results from this study call into question both a strong version of the thought -as-
language- hypothesis, the Chomskian view of an isolated grammar module, and Fodor's 
language of thought. The linguistic determinism inherent in the idea that a specific language 
influences categorization speaks to the difference between diverse languages rather than to 
the effect of symbolism per se. However, I argue that it seems unlikely that, given that both 
groups of bonobos learned the task, thought is strongly determined by language. The 
Chomskian language module cannot explain the apparent interaction between symbols and 
cognition, as it is separate from other cognitive processes. Neither does it seem likely that we 
are born with fully-fledged innate concepts that structure our thought. It would mean that a 
bonobo would be born with the concept "shoe", which is a concept they are able to apply in 
this task.  Rather, this research indicates that there is a relationship between the symbols we 
use in human language and the cognition we share with nonhuman primates. Our symbols are 
not a wholly new dimension in the human mind but build upon structures that we share with 
other primates. The question is what these structures are, where they come from, and how 
they change when the organism develops a symbolic mode of communication. 
 Kanzi and Panbanisha are individuals with extensive experience participating in 
cognitive and linguistic experiments. A counter-argument to these findings would be that 
their proficiency is not a result of symbolic competence but of experience with experimental 
tasks, including match-to-sample tasks. Two factors speak against this conclusion. Matata 
also has extensive experience with these experiments, though her performance on categorical 
matching was distinct from that of Kanzi and Panbanisha. This means that her experience 
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with the tasks did not elevate her performance on the categorization task to the level of the 
symbolically competent individuals, making experience less likely an explanation as 
symbolic competence. The second factor is the training on simple identity matching, where 
Matata performed on level with Kanzi and Panbanisha. Results indicate a difference between 
those two tasks in that Matata was able to use her experience to perform on pair with Kanzi 
and Panbanisha on the identity matching task, but not on the categorical matching task, 
where her missing symbolic capacities made the task more difficult for her. The training task 
was also intended to familiarize Nyota and Maisha with the task, and Maisha performed at a 
higher level on the categorical matching task than on the identity-matching task, indicating 
learning something about the tasks. But this learning still did not help him perform as well as 
Kanzi and Panbanisha. 
 Due to the small number of subjects, it was not possible to test for influence of age 
and sex on performance. Kanzi, Panbanisha and Matata are older than Maisha and Nyota. 
The fact that none of the younger individuals fell into the symbolically competent group 
might indicate that differences are due to age and not symbolic competence. The 
performance of Matata again makes this explanation unlikely, as does the fact that all 
subjects are adults. Regarding sex, there were at least one male and one female in each 
group, which suggest that this factor is not a determining one.   
The body as semantic template 
 The dichotomous view of the relationship between language and thought as  either 
language determining thought or language being independent of other cognitive processes is 
not supported by this research. The question is, what would constitute a more adequate 
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theory of the relationship between language and thought.  The bonobos in this study were 
able to quickly categorize the pictured items, likely due to the relevance that these items and 
categories have in their world. However, while the fact of participating in similar daily 
activities explains why these particular categories overlap, it does not explain why humans 
and bonobos create overlapping categories or why, when in a similar environment that they 
use in a similar way, they categorize items similarly. The answer to this question needs to 
account for the fact that bonobos and other apes without comprehension and/or use of human 
language and lexigrams are capable of acquiring these categories. We likely form 
prelinguistic concepts [Mandler 2004]  upon which our symbolic language builds that is 
shared with other great apes. It has been argued that our body functions as a semantic 
template [Lakoff and Johnson 1999] in the sense that the way we move and sense the world 
influences how we construct concepts, e.g., how we divide up the world and what we attend 
to, and ultimately, how we construct sentences and talk about the world. Given our similarity 
to other apes, it is likely that our bodies and our sense apparatus construes the world in 
overlapping manners, and that this creates the foundation for creating similar concepts and 
categories according to which we understand the world.  
Levels of categories 
 The categories studied here were of different degrees of abstraction in the sense that 
the category "Food" contains several lexigrams under it, such as "chicken", "celery" and 
"lettuce". Chimpanzees who acquired the use of these lexigrams were able to subsume 
lexigrams under other lexigrams [Savage-Rumbaugh 1986], though it had not been 
previously studied whether there is a difference between the facility of a symbolically 
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competent ape and a non-symbolically competent ape to subsume the lexigrams into 
categories.  
 No consistent trend was found here in terms of which categories were easiest for the 
bonobos to learn, but there was a difference between the two groups of bonobos. Kanzi 
performed at the same level in all categories, Panbanisha performing lower on food items 
than expected, and the three control individuals all performing lower on shoe pictures than 
predicted by chance. The reason for the non-symbolically competent bonobos performing 
consistently lower on shoe category could be that they have had the least experience with 
shoes. Without a symbol to stand for it, and to refer to the items, it might not appear as a 
unified category.  Food and dogs may appear more pertinent and relevant to them, while 
symbolic communication might aid in drawing an individual's attention to items that are 
further removed from immediate interest and relevance. 
Evolution of language 
 This research speaks to the evolution of the semantic part of language. More 
specifically, it indicates that the basic structures upon which we categorize the world are 
based upon a shared primate heritage, likely based upon the way the organism interacts with 
the world. Deacon [Deacon 1997] argues that symbolism is the foundation of our language 
capacity, and that the structure of sentences (grammar, syntax) stems largely from how the 
symbols relate to each other, rather than being an independent feature or faculty. This view 
combined with the results of the current study, suggests that language evolution exploited 
semantic and conceptual abilities already present before the hominoid lineage split off from 
the lineage leading to chimpanzees and bonobos.  This makes the view that sharply separates 
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language from other cognitive abilities unlikely and, consequently, the view that we must 
account for how a separate language faculty came about superfluous. The interaction 
between symbols and other cognitive abilities should be further investigated, but the results 
of this study indicate that this interaction can and should be accounted for in terms of how 
language evolved. 
Conclusion 
 The results of this study illustrate that symbolically competent bonobos acquired 
categorization of natural categories faster than bonobos without symbolic competence, 
understood as lexigram use and comprehension of spoken words. These differences are 
unlikely to be explained by differences in age or experience with experimental tasks. The 
results indicate a connection between symbols, a fundamental part of human language, and 
other cognitive processes. They also indicate a route to how the relationship between 
language and other cognitive processes can be studied empirically, suggesting that theories 
posing a sharp distinction between language and other aspects of cognition are not supported. 
 How we conceive of the relationship between language and other cognitive processes 
has implications for how language evolution can be conceived. This study indicates that the 
effect of symbolic competencies must be accounted for.  Future research should study 
differences and similarities in how categories are used to reason and make inferences in 
symbolically competent and non-symbolically competent bonobos (or other primate species). 
It has already been noted that categorization plays an important part in human reasoning. 
Therefore, studying how categories are used in reasoning in the bonobos could further 
elucidate how language and thought interact, and what the possession of symbols does to an 
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organism. It would also be advantageous to look for ways to expand aspects of this research 
to other primates in order to establish a clearer foundation for evolutionary constructions.  
 The study would have benefitted from a larger sample size. While control subjects 
could be added, other stimuli would be required as other bonobos have not had the 
comparable experiences and would therefore not be familiar with the examples of food, 
shoes, or dogs presented here. The difference in ontogenetic experience and the difference in 
social matrix between these bonobos and other captive populations makes a redesign 
necessary before other subjects could be enrolled.  
 Due to the lack of other language-competent bonobos, including more individuals 
with Kanzi and Panbanisha is not feasible. However, chimpanzees that acquired aspects of 
sign language do exist, as do chimpanzees that previously participated in research with the 
lexigrams now employed by the bonobos. Adjustments for both individual experience and for 
the potential differences in symbolic competencies across individuals and research paradigms 
would have to be made, but there is potential for further elaboration of the findings of this 
study and for studying the extent of application of these conclusions. 
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Appendix 1 
Food items 
Peanut 
celery 
Carrot 
Egg 
Sweet potato 
Chow 
Cherrries 
Peas 
Peaches 
 
Drinks 
Juice 
Milk 
Kool-aid 
Coffee 
 
Animals 
Squirrel 
Fish 
Turtle 
Snake 
 
Body parts 
Foot 
Head 
Arm 
Swelling 
 
Objects 
Camera 
Book 
Towel 
Pillow 
Mirror 
Toothbrush 
Hose 
Tv-tape 
Lighter 
Puzzle 
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Actions 
Tickle 
Kiss 
Eat 
Bite 
Carry 
Point 
 
Clothing Articles 
Shoe 
Shirt 
Umbrella 
 
Places 
House 
Swimming pool 
River 
Car  
Play yard 
 
Names 
Sherman 
Bill 
Liz 
Matata 
Kanzi 
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B: Spoken word-to-picture match 
 
Food Items 
Peanut 
Carrot 
Sweet potato 
Cherries 
Peaches 
Potato 
Grapes 
Melon 
Tomato 
 
Drinks 
Juice 
Kool-aid 
Water 
Tea 
 
 
 
Animals 
Fish 
Snake 
Dog  
Orangutan 
 
Body parts 
Head 
Swelling 
Hand 
Tummy 
 
 
 
 
Objects 
Book 
Pillow 
Toothbrush 
Tv-tape 
Puzzle 
82 
 
Hammer 
TV 
Spoon 
Paint 
Knife 
 
Clothing Articles 
Shoe 
Umbrella 
Mask 
 
 
Actions 
Tickle 
Eat 
Bite 
Point 
Hug 
Groom 
 
 
 
Places 
House 
Swimming pool 
River 
Car  
Play yard 
 
 
Names 
Bill 
Matata 
Panbanisha 
Ted 
Sue 
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C: Spoken Word-to-Lexigram match 
 
Food items 
Raisin 
Potato 
Mushroom 
Grapes 
Burrito 
Melon 
Apple 
Tomato 
Peaches 
Chicken 
 
 
 
Drinks 
Water 
Perrier 
Tea 
Coke 
 
Animals 
Bird 
Dog 
Orangutan 
 
 
 
 
Body parts 
Hand 
Ear 
Tummy 
Bottom 
 
 
Objects 
Plastic bag 
Hammer 
Rock 
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TV 
Phone 
Spoon 
Stick 
Paint 
Stethoscope 
Knife 
 
Clothing Articles 
Hat 
Mask 
Collar 
 
Actions 
Groom 
Hug 
Chase 
Open 
Play 
Hide 
 
 
 
Places 
Outdoors 
Colony room 
Cabinet 
Sandpile 
Bedroom 
 
Names 
Panbanisha 
Lana 
Ted 
Sue 
P-Suke 
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Chapter 4. Auditory or visual arbitrary association: is there a difference in 
the learning abilities of symbolically competent and non-symbolically 
competent apes? 
Paper to be submitted to American Journal of Primatology 
Janni Pedersen 
Abstract 
 Symbolic thought and its manifestation in language have been viewed as a hallmark 
of human evolution. Due to the fact that spoken or gestural language does not fossilize, 
methods other than direct evidence are used to make inferences about language evolution. Of 
particular interest is the issue of auditory versus visual symbolization and the issue of the 
effect of previously learned symbols on symbol acquisition. I present data from a study of 
symbolically competent bonobos compared with a non-symbolically competent control group 
on the acquisition on auditory and visual symbolic relations. No significant differences were 
found, and the results are discussed in light of methodological issues and the gestural origins 
theory of language, which is not supported by this study. 
Introduction 
 Symbolic thought is often viewed as a hallmark of human evolution [Bar-Yosef 2002; 
Deacon 1997; Facchini 2000; Henshilwood and Marean 2003; Klein and Edgar 2002]. It 
constitutes a crucial aspect of the basis for language, and it is thought to have been a driving 
force behind technological and social organization in humans [Donald 1997; Donald 2001]. 
While language is arguably the most conspicuous expression of human symbolic abilities, 
due to the fact that spoken or gestural language does not leave physical remains or traces, 
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other methods, such as other forms of symbolic artifacts and other indirect evidence, have 
been used to construct hypotheses about language evolution and whether language was 
present or absent at a specific point in time.  
 A symbol can be defined as a sign exhibiting an arbitrary and/or conventional 
relationship to the item or meaning it signifies, the referent [Pierce 1991]. According to 
classic Piercian semiotics, this must be understood in contrast to signs that are iconic or 
indexical, having a physical or causal relation to their referent, respectively [Pierce 1991]. 
However, a feature of symbolism often overlooked is that they are also defined by the 
internal relationship inside the symbolic system [Deacon 1997]. More specifically, symbols 
are part of a system and derive their meaning not merely as a referent but also through their 
relation to other symbols in the system. An example is dictionary entries, where words are 
defined by other words. [Deacon 1997] emphasized this in an evolutionary context and as a 
background for the development of syntax.  
 Archaeological remains have been paramount as indicators of the presence or non-
presence of linguistic abilities as evidenced in modified remains, in particular tool making 
[Bar-Yosef and Van Peer 2009; Davidson 2010] . The cognitive abilities inferred to be 
required for the manufacture of symbolic artifacts are often thought to be the same as or 
closely related to those involved in language, which means their presence might indicate 
whether their makers possessed symbolic language [Facchini 2000]. Some of the earliest 
signs of symbols, such as orchre engravings, date to around 75,000 – 100,000 years BP 
[Henshilwood et al. 2009]. This, however, does not exclude the possibility that symbolic 
communication was present earlier than the oldest symbolically modified remains found.   
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 It has been hypothesized that symbols had a ratcheting effect on human cognition, 
meaning that once symbolic thought was first started, it changed human cognition in a way 
so that new symbols, and new cognitive operations, were acquired faster [Deacon 1997]. In 
the present study, I will use data from bonobo subjects that vary in their experience with 
elements of human language to address whether the previous mastery of a symbolic mode of 
communication facilitates the learning of new symbolic associations and, further, whether 
auditory or visual symbolic associations are easier to acquire. 
 Symbols have often been understood as uniquely human [Penn et al. 2008; Terrace 
1985], though this is a disputed claim [Marler 2000; Ribeiro et al. 2007; Savage-Rumbaugh 
et al. 1978]. Research indicates that a range of species is capable of learning to associate a 
sign with a referent that has no physical or causal resemblance to the sign (REF). The field of 
ape language research provides examples of a chimpanzee using plastic tokens to represent 
items, features, and relations [Premack 1971], as well as of chimpanzees using manual signs, 
derived from American Sign Language for the Deaf, to stand for objects, persons, and places 
[Gardner and Gardner 1985; Terrace 1979]. The subjects of my study come from an 
experimental tradition that has used colorful visual symbols, lexigrams, to function as words 
[Savage-Rumbaugh 1986; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1978; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1998].  
 Outside the primate order, evidence also exists for the acquisition of symbolic 
capabilities.  The famous African gray parrot, Psittacus erithacus, Alex, learned to use 
spoken words to refer to objects, colors, numbers, and other features of the world 
[Pepperberg 1999; Pepperberg 2007], and bottle-nosed dolphins Tursiops truncatus acquired 
the comprehension and use of an artificial language consisting of a mixture of gestures, 
sounds, and bodily indication to visual symbols [Herman and Gordon 1974].  On the level of 
88 
 
naturally occurring communication studied in the field, much evidence points to 
vocalizations of some monkey species (e.g., Cercopithecus aethiops, Cercopithecus diana, 
Cercopithecus mitis stuhlmanni ) having defined reference in that they designate specific 
predators, not merely state of arousal or fear [Cheney and Seyfarth 1992; Papworth et al. 
2008; Zuberbuhler 2000].  
 Critics have maintained that the communicative acts of the artificial languages used in 
studies with nonhuman animals can be explained by simple conditioning, however.  It is not 
always clear, for example, whether a communicating subject is aware of the reference 
relation and understands the sign as a ‘word’.  In the case of the vervet monkeys, there is no 
indication that they are aware of the vocalization serving as a symbol, the reference therefore 
being functional rather than symbolic [Seyfarth and Cheney 1992]. This issue of 
intentionality and comprehension of the symbolic relation was studied by Savage-Rumbaugh 
[1986] with the chimpanzees Sherman and Austin. The apes had acquired the use of 
lexigrams to coordinate tasks, such as tool exchange and food sharing. They then learned to 
categorize not just items but also lexigrams according to which group they belong. This is to 
say, a banana and an orange belong together because they both are instances of the food 
category, and the lexigrams for the same items also belong together, grouped together by the 
food lexigram. This has been taken as indication that Sherman and Austin learned that the 
lexigrams stood for something, that lexigrams had a symbolic relation to items and to each 
other as symbols, and that even though much reinforcement and conditioning had gone into 
these behaviors, they had moved beyond the conditioning paradigm [Deacon 1997; Savage-
Rumbaugh 1986].  The bonobos in my study, Kanzi and Panbanisha, acquired the ability to 
recognize symbolic relation spontaneously without the need for explicit conditioning or 
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training other than attempts to awake the bonobos' interest in words and lexigrams 
[Segerdahl et al. 2005].  
 Symbols can be visual or auditory (possibly, also tactile). In the case of human 
language, this is seen in the existence of both sign languages and spoken languages. 
Nonhuman primates communicate both vocally and gesturally, and the difference between 
those two modes of communication has been investigated in order to better understand the 
form of the first human symbolic language. Some research has found that the vocalizations of 
great apes are inflexible, driven by emotions rather than volition [Gosset et al. 2001; Marler 
1998; Marler and Mitani 1988]. Thereby, they signify emotional state rather than information 
about the environment [Burling 1993]. Specifically, certain studies have shown a larger 
flexibility in the gestural communication of chimpanzees and bonobos than in their 
vocalizations. Pollick and de Waal [2007] conducted a comparative study of the gestural and 
vocal communication of both Pan species. They concluded that ape gestures are more 
flexible, less tied to particular emotions, and under a greater degree of volitional control.  A 
further feature was the greater degree of inter-group differences in gestures than in 
vocalizations, which may indicate individual learning and/or social influence as seen in 
human language [Pollick and de Waal 2007].  Species differences were also observed in this 
study, with the bonobos being more flexible in both the gestural and the vocal realm. 
 However, the view of primate gestures as flexible and learned while their 
vocalizations are innate and inflexible is a picture not universally agreed upon. Other studies 
indicate that the apes' vocalizations might be more flexible than previously thought. Brosnan 
and de Waal [2001] studied food vocalizations of captive chimpanzees and found that both 
audience as well as quality and quantity of food influenced vocalizations, which indicate a 
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control and flexibility over vocalizations that is not reflected in the study referenced above. 
Cases of group-specific calls have also been reported [Crockford et al. 2004], and a study has 
indicated that Kanzi, a bonobo subject of the current study, modified his vocalizations to 
attempt to produce sounds more comparable to the spoken English he comprehends 
[Taglialatela et al. 2003] 
 Studies of ape communication have focused on the production of signals. However, to 
draw conclusions about early hominid symbolism, it is crucial to also study the learnability 
and comprehension of signals. The first symbol-users would have to not only produce a 
symbol but to understand and learn the symbols produced by others in the group. A system of 
symbolic communication would only be maintained across generations if it could be 
understood and reproduced by subsequent generations. Therefore, my study will focus on 
two questions. First, is a visual or an auditory conventionalized relation easier to learn for a 
bonobo? Secondly, does the previous possession of symbols facilitate the learning of new 
symbols? This last question lends input as to whether and how symbolism could have had a 
ratcheting effect in human evolution, and whether the creative explosion seen in the 
archaeological record from around 45.000 years ago [Klein and Edgar 2002] has a 
corresponding bias in learnability of new symbols. 
Methods 
 This study was conducted at the Great Ape Trust of Iowa, Des Moines. Five bonobos 
participated, three males and two females. Of these, two individuals, Kanzi and Panbanisha, 
are well known for their ability to comprehend spoken English and use lexigrams (visual 
symbols that stand for words) to communicate [Lyn and Savage-Rumbaugh 2000; Savage-
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Rumbaugh and Fields 2000; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1993]. Three other individuals with 
little competence with lexigrams and spoken words, Nyota, Maisha, and Matata functioned 
as the control group. The age of the subjects range from 13 years to more than 40 years of 
age; the oldest being Matata who was wild caught and whose precise age is therefore 
unknown. I attempted to include a sixth bonobo, female Elikya, but she was unwilling to 
participate in the experiment and was therefore dropped from the study.  
 The subjects are socially housed with access to both inside and outside areas. While 
the whole group is rarely together at the same time, the groupings shift depending upon ape 
mood, research demands, etc. Timing and sequence of testing was coordinated with staff to 
accommodate other demands, such as bonobo wishes for activities and grouping, caretaking 
duties, etc.  
General procedure 
 The tests were designed as a match-to-sample test requiring the apes to acquire 
arbitrary relations. Two forms of tests were presented: an auditory and a visual arbitrary 
matching task, testing whether it would influence the performance that the sign (symbol) was 
visually or auditory presented.   
 The apes first went through training on an identity match-to-sample task in order to 
familiarize the inexperienced bonobos with the touch screen apparatus. As part of a broader 
study, they also went through a categorical matching task. They first completed the visual 
matching task and then proceeded to the auditory matching task. Finally, the bonobos were 
presented with a test of their preexisting symbolic capacities in the form of matching 
lexigrams, pictures, and spoken words (Pedersen, in preparation, chapter 3) in order to ensure 
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that they were correctly classified as symbolically competent or as member of the control 
group. That test showed a significant difference between Kanzi and Panbanisha on the one 
side, and the other bonobos. In the control group, each individual only performed above 40% 
correct in one out of 6 sessions, each consisting of 50 trials. Kanzi and Panbanisha performed 
between 58% and 85% correct on the same experiment.  
 Testing took place on a large touch screen connected to a Windows computer and 
controlled externally by the experimenter. The bonobo accessed the touch screen by entering 
a small room, accessed through a large room where the apes would often spend parts of the 
day. The apes would always separate for testing and, if hesitant, the tester would wait until 
they were ready to enter the testing room by themselves.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Kanzi working on the match-to-sample task 
 
Visual matching task 
 The visual matching task was a match-to-sample task. The stimuli would appear in 
the middle of the screen.  The bonobo would touch the screen to achknowledge the picture, 
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after which the choices would appear in any of the other quadrants of the screen.  The 
location and sequence of pictures was randomized. 
 Ten sets of graphic image (picture-of-object pairings), or different arbitrary relations, 
were presented. Two examples are depicted below (Figure 2). The graphic images were 
created using the software Tierazon, which uses fractal equations to create images. The 
pictures were of objects that the bonobos do not have lexigrams for. 
                                       
Fig. 2. Examples of matching pairs used in the visual conventionalized matching task 
  
 Each session consisted of 50 trials, which means that each pair would show up five 
times. To facilitate learning, the bonobos were first introduced to the pairings in a one-choice 
task, with no possibility of error since the only choice would be the correct match. They then 
moved onto a two choice task, where they had to reach criterion of 60% (probability 0.5, 
N=50, P= 0.0419) before progressing to the three choice-task, which had a 44% criterion 
(probability 0.33, N=50, P=0.0025). In other words, they had to perform at 44% percent 
correct before the task was considered completed. A list of the objects used in pictures can be 
found in appendix 1.    
Auditory matching task 
 The auditory matching task resembled the visual matching task, but the graphic image 
was replaced by a sound. The stimuli sets consisted of 10 sound-picture pairs, and the 
difficulty of the task progressed from one to three choices. Each session consisted of 50 
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trials, which corresponded to the procedure for the visual matching task. Consequently, the 
criterion was also the same, 60% and 44%, respectively.  
 The sounds used were nonsense words, created to imitate one- or two-syllable words. 
Some of them were words from another language that the bonobos do not know. They were 
recordings of the voice of a person the bonobos do not meet often. The pictures were of 
objects that the bonobos do not possess lexigrams for. List of objects and transcripts of sound 
can be found in appendix 2.  
              
Fig. 3. Examples of pictures used in the auditory conventionalized matching task to match with 
sounds 
 
Results 
 Figures 4 and 5 summarize the results for the visual association task and the auditory 
association task, respectively. Data in terms of number of sessions to reach criterion and 
average percentage correct are included, and is presented for both each individual and for the 
two groups. There is individual variation in terms of number of sessions to reach criterion 
and in average percentage correct. Also the required number of sessions between the two 
choice and the three choice task varies.  
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Fig. 4. Summary of results from visual association matching task 
 
 It should be noted that Panbanisha did not complete the three choice part of the visual 
association task. She was not interested in the task, and it was sometimes difficult to motivate 
her to participate. When she did decide to participate, she would work through the task very 
fast, not paying attention to choosing correctly. Rather, she would be interested in completing 
the session fast and getting the reward she had been promised for participating. After 35 
sessions, I decided to exclude her from that part of the study and let her continue with the 
auditory matching task. Her data would not have informed the analysis and the risk of type II 
error would be heightened had she been included.  As can be seen in Figure 4, this also 
influenced the results for the symbolically group as a whole since Kanzi became the only 
member of this group. In Figure 4, I excluded the averages when appropriate, and statistical 
Visual 
arbitrary 
matching task 
Symbolically 
competent 
Kanzi Panbanisha Non-
symbolically 
competent 
Matata Maisha Nyota 
N sessions, 
 two choice 
task 
3.5 2 5 5 5 9 1 
Average  % 
correct 
52.5  58  47.007  52.229  46.8  46.889  60  
N sessions,  
three choice 
task 
N/A 10 N/A 12 8 20 8 
Average % 
correct 
N/A 29.5 N/A 33.05 % 33.75 31.9  33.5  
N sessions in 
all 
N/A 13 N/A 17 13 29 9 
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analysis either excluded this average or could account for a missing number, as I elaborate 
later. 
Auditory 
arbitrary 
 matching task 
Symbolically 
competent, 
average 
Kanzi Panbanisha Non-
symbolically 
competent, 
average 
Matata Maisha Nyota 
N sessions,  
two choice task 
2.5 3 2 5.667 2 13 2 
Average  % 
correct 
53.833  52.667  55  53.5  61.5  50  49  
N sessions,  
three choice 
task 
7 4 10 6.66 8 2 10 
Average %  
correct 
36.05  40.5  31.6  34.85  35.25  36  33.3  
N sessions in 
all 
9.5 7 12 12.333 10 15 12 
Fig. 5 Auditory matching task 
 
 All subjects completed the auditory matching task. As seen in both in Figures 4 and 5, 
there was a great deal of individual variation in the performance of individuals. 
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Fig. 6. Summary of the number of sessions to reach criterion, both for individual bonobos and for the 
two groups 
 
 A visual inspection of Figure 6 and 7 reveals very clear individual differences. For 
instance, Maisha performs at a higher level on the auditory three-choice task than he did 
compared to the visual three-choice task, but for the two-choice task, the picture is reversed. 
Nyota performs well except for the three-choice auditory task, where he needs more sessions 
than Maisha to reach criterion. Kanzi is more stable, while Panbanisha's performance is hard 
to interpret due to her reluctance to participate in the visual matching task. 
 
 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
Number of sessions, visual 
association 2 choice 
Number of sessions, visual 
association, 3 choice 
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Fig. 7 Summary of the number of sessions needed to reach criterion on the auditory matching task, 
both for individuals and for the two groups 
 
 Differences at the group-level were analyzed using SAS 9.32 and Microsoft Excel.  A 
generalized linear model was developed to test for differences between the two tasks and 
between the two groups. The differences between the symbolically competent bonobos and 
the control group in terms of number of sessions to reach criterion were non-significant 
(df=15, t=0.15 P=0.8816).  Similarly, there was no significant difference between the visual 
or the auditory task (df=15, t= -1.25, P=0.2306).  
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 Another measure of performance is percentage correct, which is a measure included 
in Figures 4 and 5. The differences in the average percentage correct were analyzed using a 
Mann-Whitney U-test due to the non-parametric nature of the data. First, the overall overage 
between the visual two-choice task was compared to the auditory two-choice task, which 
showed that there was no significant difference (Ua= 17, Z= -0.84, P=0.4009). This is to say, 
on average, the bonobos had as many correct on the visual task as on the auditory task when 
presented with two choices. The three-choice tasks were not compared because Panbanisha 
did not complete the visual three-choice task, and it would therefore be difficult to interpret 
the results.  
 The performance on the two-choice task was also compared for the symbolically 
competent group and the control group. This means that the averages for each group on the 
two-choice visual and the two-choice auditory task were compared. This also did not show 
any significant difference (Ua= 14, Z= -0.21, P=0.8337). Any difference between the two 
groups in terms of percentage correct was therefore not statistically significant but due to 
chance and/or individual variation. 
Discussion 
 My study found no significant differences in terms of the learnability of visual or 
auditory symbols. Consequently, it does not refute the claim that auditory signs could have 
served as the first symbolic signs. More specifically, results of this study do not support the 
gestural origin theory of language. If we factor in how easily a symbolic relation is acquired, 
which is equivalent for the auditory and the visual domain according to this study, there is no 
support for preferring gestures over vocalizations. While a gestural origin of language cannot 
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be excluded based on the data presented here, other studies have lent support to a multimodal 
origin of language [Leavens 2003; Leavens et al. 2010]. A study by Tagliatelata and 
colleagues [Taglialatela et al. 2011] used PET brain imaging technology to study the activity 
of the chimpanzee homologue of Broca's area during communicative acts. They found that 
only when using communicative gestures, and not when using vocalizations alone, did the 
chimpanzees exhibit an increased activity in Broca's area, which suggests, contrary to the 
gestural origin theory, that vocal signaling was involved in the evolution of language. 
Leavens [Leavens 2003] argues that the evidence of voluntary control of vocalizations in 
chimpanzees implies that this ability predates the split of at least the Pan and the Homo lines. 
The current results would further substantiate these arguments.   
 Certain features of the design of this experiment make this conclusion preliminary, 
however. First, a graphic image and a gesture cannot be directly equated. I decided to use the 
graphic images in this study both to facilitate the comparison between the two conditions in 
the computerized task and because the bonobos communicate with graphic symbols. This 
means that using graphic symbols made it unnecessary to account for cross-modal transfer, in 
the sense of the bonobos’ understanding vocal and visual symbols. However, they might not 
understand gestures symbolically (e.g., acquire sign language). If gestures had been used in 
this experiment, it would have been difficult to investigate the influence of symbols on the 
learnability of new symbolic relations in that the bonobos would have had to transfer the 
symbolic skills from one domain (lexigram or vocal) to another domain, gestures. Therefore, 
the conditions for the vocal and the visual, gestural, condition would not have been 
comparable.  
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 A second issue raising doubt about how far the conclusions of this study can be taken 
is the performance of Panbanisha, who did not appear to show her best efforts.  The small 
number of subjects makes this an issue, as Kanzi is left as the only symbolically competent 
subject for the visual three-choice task. More subjects would have made the study less 
dependent upon the motivation of an individual. But this is difficult, as a larger sample size 
would require subjects who have a documented knowledge of the lexigrams and spoken 
words. While these are the only bonobos with these documented abilities, and it takes many 
years to raise new apes on this level of symbolic competence, there are three chimpanzees at 
the Language Research Center, Georgia, Atlanta, who acquired the lexigrams through 
previous participation in the research project.  Including them would mean that the method 
would need to be adjusted to exactly their level of familiarity, but a future extension of this 
study could examine their performance, and the additional number of subjects would 
significantly increase the general validity of my conclusions.  
 My study did not detect any difference in the ease of acquisition between the two 
bonobo groups depending upon their previous knowledge of symbols, either in terms of 
number of sessions to reach criterion or in terms of average percentage correct. Panbanisha's 
reluctance to participate and the small number of subjects make these conclusions 
preliminary. However, the choice of stimuli and the method of acquisition might be another 
issue here. The stimuli were chosen for reasons stated above. They were not created to 
resemble the lexigrams, which have been created with different designs in mind through the 
years. Therefore, they are not uniformly created either. It is possible that graphic images 
more closely resembling some of the lexigrams in structure would be easier to learn for the 
symbolically competent bonobos. It is also possible that the mode of acquisition, 
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conditioning through reinforcements with sound and food rewards in a task outside of daily 
language use, made for the lack of difference between the two groups. The method was 
chosen based on the assumption that given that the symbols (lexigrams and words) were 
already in place, this method would be sufficient. However, the lexigrams and words were 
not acquired through a formal task but through use in daily interactions. It is possible that the 
conclusions would be different had these new symbols been learned in that manner. 
However, that approach was not chosen for several reasons; one of which is the difficulty to 
make comparisons with the non-symbolic control group since it would not be feasible, 
though not impossible, to introduce a symbol in the control group. As stated in the 
introduction, a symbol is not merely the conventionalized relation between a sign and its 
referent. A symbol takes its place among a system of symbols, and the methods in this study 
did not account for that. It would be of interest to develop a method to introduce the symbols 
not as isolated conventionalized relations, but as part of a system in a way that would still 
create equal conditions for both groups but while not interfering with their daily use of 
lexigrams and words. It has been suggested that symbols had a ratcheting effect in human 
evolution, which is to say that once a symbol was learned, new symbols be easier to acquire 
and the repertoire would quickly expand. While the results of the current study do not 
support such an effect, the above-mentioned limitations make it hard to derive a conclusion. 
Further research is needed to establish whether it is easier for a bonobo to learn symbols after 
already acquiring symbols previously.   
 The origin of symbolic thought and language is crucial for understanding human 
evolution. The study of nonhuman primates, and possibly other species, provides crucial 
insight into an area that is difficult to approach from archaeological or paleoanthropological 
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remains, as spoken or gestural language do not leave traces. The current study suggests that 
visual and auditory symbolic relations might be equal in terms of learnability, which does not 
support claims of the need for a non-auditory stage in language evolution. Another issue is 
how the initial acquisition of symbols changed the subsequent evolution of human culture, in 
particular whether the previous comprehension of symbols facilitates the mastery of new 
symbolic relations. My study could not support this claim, due to both methodological issues 
and issues with the low number of bonobo participants and the motivation of one bonobo.  
Although these conclusions are preliminary in a sense, future research could investigate these 
questions. In particular, my study has elucidated some of the issues when addressing such 
questions and could facilitate more conclusive future studies.  
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Appendix 1: Stimuli used for the visual matching task 
 
 
    
 
Fractal 1 and Photo 1 
 
 
                    
 
Fractal 2 and Photo 2 
 
              
 
 
Fractal 3 and Photo 3 
 
 
               
 
Fractal 4 and Photo 4 
 
                             
107 
 
 
Fractal 5 and Photo 5 
 
       
 
Fractal 6 and Photo 6 
 
       
 
Fractal 7 and Photo 7 
 
       
 
Fractal 8 and Photo 8 
 
       
 
Fractal 9 and Photo 9 
 
 
     
 
Fractal 10 and Photo 10 
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Appendix 2: Stimuli used for the auditory matching task 
 
Baha      
 
Word 1 and Photo 1 
 
Hoppe                          
 
Word 2 and Photo 2 
 
 
Ifa                                 
 
Word 3 and Photo 3 
 
Alman                               
 
Word 4 and Photo 4 
 
Grappa                           
                                     
Word 5 and Photo 5 
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Enuka            
 
Word 6 and Photo 6 
Ymer       
 
Word 7 and Photo 7 
 
Hekate     
 
Word 8 and Photo 8 
     
Krille  
 
Word 9 and Photo 9 
Moneto            
 
Word 10 and Photo 10 
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Chapter 5. Language evolution: The lesson from bonobo language research 
Paper to be submitted to Current Anthropology 
Janni Pedersen 
Abstract 
 This paper discusses two central themes in the current debate of language evolution. 
First, whether language was a recently evolved uniquely human faculty, or rather a 
conglomerate of abilities shared with other primates. Secondly, whether language had a 
vocal or a gestural origin. It is argued, based upon language research with bonobos, Pan 
paniscus, that language is preferably understood as a range of cognitive abilities, which 
bonobos, and other apes, exhibit varying degrees of competence in. Symbolic competence is 
a central ability for language. It is argued that the symbolic abilities of the bonobos emerged 
given certain social environments, which indicates that differing social environments during 
hominid history, shaped by the hominids themselves, could have played a role in shaping 
language. It is then suggested that social niche construction theory provides the best 
framework for explaining the "why" of language evolution. This leads to the question of the 
form of the first forms of symbolic language, and whether the recent surge of theories 
arguing for a gestural origin of language are well-funded. I conclude that a multimodal 
origin is more likely; among other lines of evidence, this is supported by bonobo language 
research. 
Introduction 
 The topic of language evolution is difficult to address due to the lack of evidence in 
the form of fossilized remains. It has even been suggested that the attempts to construct 
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evolutionary scenarios of language evolution should be abandoned as, due to indirect 
evidence, they cannot pertain to be more than "just-so" stories [For discussion, Fitch 2005; 
Lewontin 1998]. While it is true that the topic of language evolution poses specific problems, 
the role language plays in human evolution, human society, and our understanding of what it 
means to be human, means that the scientific debate of its origin cannot merely be abandoned 
due to methodological problems. Fortunately, there are methods to address language 
evolution rigorously. Attempts to make inferences about language evolution include 
comparative primatological research in the field and captivity [Burling 1993; Cheney and 
Seyfarth 2005; Font and Carazo 2010; Greenfield et al. 2008; Hollen and Radford 2009; 
Savage-Rumbaugh 1993], neuroanatomical studies comparing apes with humans [Hopkins 
and Cantalupo 2004; Taglialatela et al. 2011], genetic studies [Benitez-Burraco 2008; Gibson 
and Gruen 2008; Gontier 2008], studies of infant language development [Liszkowski et al. 
2006; Tomasello 1999a; Tomasello 1999b], language pathologies [Marcus and Rabagliati 
2006], as well as computer simulations [Kirby et al. 2007; Oller 2002] and anatomical studies 
of fossilized hominids [Lieberman 2007].   
 In this paper, I will discuss the issue of language evolution specifically in light of 
language research with bonobos, Pan paniscus. Focus will be on two central questions in the 
contemporary debate on language origins: The first is whether language is best viewed as a 
recently evolved, fairly independent ability, or if language should rather be seen as a 
conglomerate of preexisting cognitive abilities present in the last common ancestor (LCA) of 
humans and Pan. The second question is whether the first form of language, or 
protolanguage, was gestural. This proposal is, among other things, based on the assertion that 
the closest to human language in nonhuman primates is their gestures, not their vocalizations. 
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Recent data from research with symbolically competent bonobos and specific comparison 
between symbolically competent and non-symbolically competent apes will be included to 
address these questions and to pose suggestions as to what form of evolutionary process 
shaped human language. 
Innate or learned, unique or shared 
  The discussion as to whether language is a wholly innate ability, unique to the Homo 
lineage, or whether it is an acquired ability relying upon more generalized and shared 
learning and cognitive abilities, was in the 20th century personified by Chomsky and 
Skinner. Chomsky [1985; 1987; 1988] famously argued that language is in its core syntactic 
abilities, an inborn human ability to acquire specific grammars, that is unrelated to anything 
in other species. This ability did likely not evolve due to natural selection, as it has no 
apparent survival benefit; rather, it could have been a mutation.  Chomsky proposed the brain 
mutation underlying language more as a way to avoid addressing the question of language 
evolution than as a real proposal to how language originated. In his own view, the question is 
ill framed and cannot be answered coherently. Pinker [1994] advocated a view of language 
similar to Chomsky’s but added that natural selection could account for its evolution. 
Enhanced communication would be the feature that allowed more proficient language users 
to have a survival benefit.   
 Skinner, a behaviorist, proposed that language learning could be explained like any 
other behavior; through the contingencies that have reinforced certain behaviors and not 
others [Skinner 1957]. Thereby, language becomes a behavior not different than other 
behaviors and, in principle, within reach of other species. The only significant difference is 
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that in humans, vocal behavior has come under operant control, meaning that vocalizations 
are capable of being influenced by reinforcement. In other species, vocal behavior is not 
under operant conditioning [Skinner 1986]. Thereby, speech becomes the point of separation 
between human and nonhuman animals.  
 Other positions in linguistics, for instance functionalism [Jablonka and Lamb 2005], 
maintain that while the behaviorists learning mechanisms need to be broadened beyond 
operant conditioning, language is still a faculty as other cognitive faculties and might be 
within the reach of other species. This would likely be in the sense of partial language 
abilities, as there is no sharp divide between human and nonhuman animals.  Rather, the 
differences are, in this view, a matter of degree. Evolutionarily, there is no need to explain a 
sudden appearance of a language ability, as it was a gradual evolution from abilities already 
present in the common ancestor of Homo and Pan [Slocombe and Zuberbuhler 2005].  
Contemporary debate 
 Collaborating with Fitch and Hauser [Hauser et al. 2002], Chomsky has advocated for 
a revised position on language evolution and the associated role for nonhuman primate 
cognition and communication.  In aiming to clarify what is meant when talking about 
language, they advocate dividing language into the faculty of language in the broad sense 
(FLB) and the faculty of language in the narrow sense (FLN). FLN is defined as the 
computational system underlying language; it is what is specific to humans and specific to 
language. The specific content of FLN should be up to empirical investigations, though the 
authors' proposal for the concrete content is recursion, the ability to create potentially infinite 
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embeddedness.  They leave open the possibility of an empty FLN, which would imply that 
no ability is uniquely human and unique to language.   
 FLB consists of the broader cognitive and communicative abilities involved in 
language as a communicative system. These are presented as the conceptual-intentional 
system, the sensory-motor system, and a conglomerate of other systems.  Because these are 
potentially, and likely, shared by other species, and are involved in a range of behaviors and 
cognitive processes other than language, the comparative method is advocated to make 
evolutionary hypotheses. Evolutionary theory should account for the origin of these abilities, 
which likely evolved as responses to different selection pressures on the different abilities. 
FLN must also have been shaped by natural selection, but it is not clear that it was directly 
for the purpose of communication or language as suggested by Pinker [1994]. More likely, it 
evolved for another purpose and was then co-opted by FLB, which then resulted in what we 
know as human language.  
 Pinker and Jackendoff [2005] argue against the position presented above. They hold 
that a range of issues separate humans and nonhuman primates, such as syntax, theory of 
mind, and the specific abilities involved in the production and comprehension of speech. The 
development of language specifically was due to natural selection, a gradual evolution of a 
more advanced communication, which means that the separation into FLN and FLB is 
unnecessary. They criticize the previous proposal for ignoring both elements of grammar not 
reducible to recursion, and for ignoring the recent evidence of the Foxp2 gene having 
undergone selection in the human lineage [Enard et al. 2002]. This gene is involved in 
language, but its involvement is not reducible to recursion [Pinker and Jackendoff 2005], 
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which they take to indicate that selection for other elements of grammar than recursion took 
place in the hominid lineage, and consequently FLN cannot be delineated as proposed above. 
 The debate over how best to define language, and consequently, how it evolved, 
continues. Jackendoff and Pinker [2005] argue that language is more than recursion, and that 
the ability for vocal imitation is another highly developed feature that separates apes and 
humans. Chomsky and colleagues [Fitch et al. 2005] argue that the narrow and broad 
language faculty distinction makes the counter-arguments miss the points, and that it is 
unlikely to be possible to construct evolutionary scenarios for FLN. Recursive abilities might 
have evolved, not as a means for language, but for another purpose, perhaps navigation. The 
syntactic abilities then became able to work with the other modules involved in language, 
e.g.,the semantic/conceptual domain, through an integration that created what we understand 
as language.  
Evaluating the debate 
 This debate highlights some important issues that are relevant for discussing the 
potential contribution of bonobo language research to a better understanding of language 
evolution. Chomsky and colleagues make the relevant point that language consists of many 
faculties that likely evolved as responses to different selection pressures [Fitch et al. 2005]. 
This means that each might have a different evolutionary trajectory, and we should be 
specific about which abilities we are referring to when constructing scenarios of language 
evolution. A similar argument is made by Fitch [2010]. Modern evolutionary theory is able to 
account for these various aspects of language and, I will argue below, a full account needs to 
include co-evolution and niche construction. It is correct that constructing an evolutionary 
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scenario for FLN is difficult in the framework of Chomsky and colleagues. In my view, this 
is a problem related to the issue of the evolution of syntax, which led Chomsky to avoid 
questions of language evolution. Briefly put, it is hard to see what benefit improved syntactic 
abilities, or infinite recursion, would provide an individual without other individuals also 
possessing this ability. But if the ability is specific to language and to humans, it becomes 
difficult to imagine how this mutated ability could have taken hold, or even been used. 
Being, at least in Chomsky's original view, an all-or-nothing ability, it could not have 
provided benefit since it would have demanded a group capable of using this ability - but that 
begs the question we are trying to answer. It is also not clear how the proposal of the 
language faculty in the narrow sense as a mutation (i.e., the early proposal by Chomsky) does 
not involve some form of selection. A mutation is the variation upon which selection acts, 
and whether it expands in the population depends upon any benefits it might provide. 
However, a mutation might persist even without a benefit in the case it does not decrease 
survival or is linked to a beneficial trait. The postulate of a mutation does not solve the 
problem or remove issues of selection, rather the question why it spreads remains. 
 Chomsky and colleagues makes the more explicit, and more probable, proposal 
[Hauser et al. 2002] that recursion could have evolved in another domain; (e.g., navigation is 
a probable area) and then been co-opted for language use. In order for this proposal to work, 
however, it needs to be explained how and why recursion would evolve in the other domain, 
in this case navigation, and secondly, by what process recursion was co-opted into language. 
Chomsky and colleagues [Hauser et al. 2002] do not elaborate on this issue, as it is outside 
the scope of their article, but it is relevant to raise the question. I will argue below that, based 
on the bonobo language research and other evidence, the evolution of language can be 
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approached in a way that does not necessities  selection acting directly on a neural ability for 
recursion.  
 Pinker et al. [2005] argue that improved communication was the main driver of 
language evolution. For the claim of improved communication as a survival benefit to hold 
true, it is necessary to reconstruct the environment in which this would be the case and 
exactly which information would be better transferred through language than through 
previous means of communication [Bickerton 2008].  It is not clear that Pinker et al. have a 
coherent proposal regarding how to address that issue, and it is likely that in their 
investigation of our ancestral environment they would have to account for the need not 
merely of improved communication but of the demands posed by a new social niche. It is 
important to raise the question: why did it become important for humans to communicate 
using language rather than the communication form of the common ancestor of Homo and 
Pan?  Merely talking about improved communication does not solve the issue in that it is not 
clear that communication is improved or what improved communication would even mean. 
Claiming that it would be a benefit for a horse, a crab, or a squirrel monkey to communicate 
using fully-fledged human language is the logical conclusion of Pinker's proposal [Bickerton 
2009]. Proposing human language as the pinnacle of communication evolution assumes the 
miscredited notion of scala naturae.    
 Chomsky and colleagues [Fitch et al. 2005] maintain that besides recursion, many of 
the abilities involved in language are shared with nonhuman primates. Pinker and Jackendoff 
[2005] maintain that the differences are more widespread. While this debate is influenced by 
semantics regarding the definition of when something can be considered qualitatively 
different and when a difference is merely a matter of degree, some substantial disagreements 
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are present. There is contrary evidence to several of the abilities claimed as uniquely human. 
While it is highly arguable whether we can understand any nonhuman primates 
communicative signals as words, raised in specific environments, apes can learn to 
understand human words and may use sign language or other visual symbols as words 
[Savage-Rumbaugh 1986]. This makes it dubious that words can profitably be understood as 
uniquely human as claimed by Pinker and Jackendorf  (though Bickerton [2009] provides an 
argument why what the language trained apes use are not words). They also maintain that 
theory of mind is an ability that evolved after the Pan-Homo split. A more elaborate version 
of this is held by Tomasello, who argues that shared intentionality, a special advanced form 
of theory of mind, is what is specifically human and underlies language [Tomasello 2008]. 
However, human reared apes show evidence of behaving more human-like in this regard 
[Bulloch et al. 2008; Leavens 2006]. This makes it likely that we are talking about an ability 
that needs a specific social environment to flourish. This ability might have developed further 
in humans, but is not absent in great apes. These two examples will be further elaborated 
below in terms of bonobo language research, but here it suffice to raise doubt that Pinker's 
characterization of apes is accurate. Examining how bonobos acquired elements of language 
can reveal how the debate between Chomsky and Pinker is not the most fruitful approach to 
understanding language evolution.  
Language evolution from the perspective of a Bonobo 
 I will now turn to how language research with bonobos might provide insights into 
the debate outlined above. I will first briefly summarize some of the main findings of the 
research program, and then discuss the questions raised above in light both of the general 
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research findings and in particular, in light of newly conducted studies on the difference 
between symbolically competent and non-symbolically competent bonobos in categorization 
and in learning new arbitrary (symbolic) relations.  
Bonobo Language Research 
 Research with symbolically competent bonobos indicate that given the right 
environment from birth, they acquire elements of human language in a way similar to the 
way children acquire language [Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin 1994]. They are able to 
comprehend basic grammar in spoken English sentences [Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1993], use 
lexigrams to communicate about events both present, past, and future  [Savage-Rumbaugh 
and Fields 2000; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 2001] and to maintain conversational topic across 
longer stretches of conversation [Pedersen and Fields 2008]. A study referenced above 
indicates that at least one of these bonobos, Kanzi, uses modified vocalizations to attempt to 
"say" English words. While the vocalizations do not sound as English, spectogram analyzis 
indicate that Kanzi attempts to emulate English sounds, though his bonobo voice is unable to 
produce them in the pitch used by humans [Taglialatela et al. 2003].  
 Recent studies have indicated influence of the acquisition of symbols on other 
cognitive areas. There is evidence that the previous possession of symbols facilitates the later 
categorization of new items, in terms of training needed to acquire the categorization, 
maintenance on new stimuli, and overall level of performance in terms of percentage correct 
(Pedersen, in preparation, chapter 3).    
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Addressing language evolution 
 My approach is inspired by Fitch [Fitch 2005] who advocates departing from 
Tinbergen's four questions when addressing language evolution: Mechanistic, 
developmental, functional, and phylogenetic. While the two first questions would benefit 
from empirical knowledge gained from studies of infant language and studies of language 
function and anatomy, ape language research can contribute most to the last two last 
questions, functional and phylogenetic. This is to say, the "why" of evolution and the 
evolutionary trajectory. This does not exclude that studies of nonhuman primates may also 
contribute important information about both language mechanics and development, but the 
last two questions are the most crucial here, and they will be the present focus of discussion.   
 The question of what evolved between the Pan-Homo split can now be posed from 
the perspective of bonobo language research. The ability to acquire symbols is a shared 
ability between humans and bonobos, likely all species of great apes, but the early rearing 
conditions enable this ability to flourish. This is an ability shared among all great apes [Fitch 
2010; Miles 1997], and there is evidence that in the sense of using arbitrary associations to 
communicate, certain other species share this capacity [Herman and Gordon 1974; 
Pepperberg 2007]. Phylogenetically, this indicates that our LCA did have symbolic abilities 
(and that this ability likely goes further back to the common ancestor of all the great apes and 
developed independently in other lineages), but we do not know how they were expressed 
and/or used. Combined with the effect of symbols on other cognitive abilities, this indicates 
an effect where the social environment favored more and more advanced use of symbols, 
while this change continued having influence on other areas of homonid cognition. This will 
be elaborated below. 
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 The view of language as a multi-faceted ability involving many abilities is supported 
by this research. Most of these have precursors in the abilities of bonobos, abilities that 
flourish given certain conditions during ontogeny. Of these abilities can be mentioned: 
symbolic communication and enhanced understanding of intentionality [Savage-Rumbaugh 
et al. 1998],  more elaborate use and comprehension of indexical gestures [Lyn et al. 2011; 
Pedersen et al. 2009], and pretense [Lyn et al. 2006]. Therefore, the idea of language as a 
recently evolved novel addition to the human mind does not seem probable. Rather, we 
should look at the conditions that made the pre-existing abilities develop into full-fledged 
language.  
Why Evolved 
 The current study indicates that the increased symbolization might not only have had 
a communicational function, but also a function in increased cognitive ability, which has 
been suggested by several scholars [Bickerton 2009; Deacon 1997; Lieberman 1998]. There 
is no reason there could not have been more than one evolutionary function to a trait.  The 
question is why did the conceptual abilities present in apes, and therefore, likely present in 
our last common ancestor, developed into what we understands as language?  
 The best proposal is the creation of a niche where the abilities and conditions created 
by the increased symbolic abilities favored ever increasing abilities. This environment is 
largely dependent upon the behavior of other individuals in the social group. Schoenenman 
[Schoenemann 2009] emphasizes the co-evolution of brain and language, and how a richer 
conceptual world was part of that interdependent process. A language has to be learnable by 
infants, which means it must correspond to the learning bias of a human infant. More 
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precisely, language must adopt to the human brain in order to be learnable and transmitted to 
next generation [Deacon 1997]. It has been argued elsewhere that the process was inverse, 
that changes in the brain evolved language [Pinker and Bloom 1990] but since the process of 
language adapting to the brain is many times faster than genetic evolution, and given that 
language would quickly have disappeared if it had not replicated, I argue that Deacon's 
proposal of a co-evolutionary process, with language adapting to the brain leading the 
process, is the most likely. It is also more in line with the symbolic abilities of the bonobos. 
These observations are the background for seeing the evolution of language in the light of 
niche construction theory, a concept not used explicitly by Schoenenmann himself.  
Co-evolution and niche construction   
 Laland and coworkers [Brown et al. 2011; Laland et al. 2010; Odling-Smee et al. 
2000; Vandermeer et al. 2004] have argued that niche construction theories should be applied 
to human evolution, and to human cultural evolution in particular. Niche construction is an 
elaboration of gene-culture co-evolution theories, (for overview, [Richerson and Boyd 2005; 
Richerson and Boyd 2010] but it provides a more coherent evolutionary framework and is 
capable of formulating testable hypotheses [Kendal et al. 2011]. Niche construction theory 
observes that an organism does not passively inhabit an environment but modifies it to suit 
its needs simply by living there; eating food, constructing living places (nests, burrows etc). 
This means that the selection pressure may change as a result of the activities of the 
organism, and consequently offsprings are left a modified environment, an environment that 
is now the environment they must adapt to. Thereby, modifications of environment by 
organisms may have evolutionary consequences. Social niche construction is the observation 
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that also the social environment changes, sometimes in an interaction with the physical 
environment, thereby creating a social niche to which the organism modifies its behavior and 
adapts. This is thought to be particular relevant for humans.  
 Some adaptations to new niches are behavioral while others are genetic. However, 
these two processes are not separate. Through genetic accommodation, or as it has been 
known, the Baldwin effect [Laland 2003; West-Eberhard 2003], what is first a behavioral 
adaptation may become genetically channeled. Those who have a genetic foundation for 
acquiring the behavior faster and better may have an advantage, which means that future 
generations will have an enhanced ability for this ability [Jablonka and Lamb 2005].  
 These processes have rarely been applied directly to language evolution, though 
Jablonka and Lamb [2005] have proposed a scenario. They state that language is an outcome 
of continuous interaction between genetic and behavioral inheritance. Their basic scenario is 
a group of individuals with a limited repertoire of vocal and gestural signals. As their culture 
develops, it becomes more important to communicate more complex things. If someone came 
up with a way to indicate basic grammatical relations (such as who did what to whom, or 
whether it was past or present time), it would lessen the strain on memory and enhance the 
ability to communicate complex relations important in this new niche. This is a cultural 
innovation, likely to persist as it is used often and in many situations. Some individuals will 
have a genetically facilitated easier learning of this new communication system. The 
advantages could be memory, motor control or social awareness. It is important to note that 
these skills are used in many other contexts than communication. Over time, the culture will 
consist of more efficient learners due to selection based on this new cultural niche. Part of the 
learning of language is now genetically assimilated which frees up cognitive power for 
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further cultural evolution of the linguistic communication system. This proposal is in line 
with other proposals that language adapted just as much, or more, to the human brain than the 
human brain adapted to language [Deacon 1997; Schoenemann 2009].  
 Based on the language research with bonobos, I propose that niche construction 
played a significant role in language evolution. The bonobos at the Great Ape Trust of Iowa 
acquired a system of communication that other bonobos do not use, a system they are capable 
of employing in a coordinated exchange, a conversation, which has not been documented 
among other apes. This is not to say that coordinated exchanges/communication do not take 
place among other apes (or that there are levels of communicational exchanges that we have 
not yet discovered or not yet understood ) but this is not symbolically mediated, at least not 
according to our current knowledge. The construction of a new environment will have an 
effect on the organisms. While there are not yet any rigorous studies documenting how this 
environment will affect behavior or genetics across the generations of bonobos, it is clear that 
the environment changed the individuals. 
 Bickerton [2009] currently argues for symbols being the fundamental feature theories 
of language evolution needs to explain, and niche construction is the explanation advocated.  
This is a change from his previous position that saw language from a Chomskian perspective, 
as grammar [Bickerton 1990]. This new framework has many things in common with the 
view I am advocating here. However, his view that other species lack conceptual abilities 
might not be the most productive or accurate. His main criticism against Kanzi's 
accomplishments in the tests of his comprehension of spoken English sentences compared to 
a human infant [Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1993] is the statement that practical knowledge and 
inference rather than syntactic comprehension facilitated Kanzi's high level of correct 
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responses. According to Deacon [Deacon 1997] and Schoenenmann [Schoenemann 2009], 
syntax is a consequence of the semantic content in symbols, it modifies and helps understand 
the content of a sentence. This is in accordance with the observation that in certain cases, 
grammar facilitates Kanzi's comprehension of a sentence rather than impedes it [Savage-
Rumbaugh et al. 2009]. Kanzi's pattern of errors and successes makes it likely that he does 
understand words symbolically and use the relation between these symbols in decoding 
grammatical relations in sentences.  
  In contrast to the proposal, discussed above, by Chomsky, Pinker and their 
colleagues, the question becomes what activities of hominids, what niche, made them 
develop their conceptual abilities into symbolic language and thought. The bonobos acquired 
their symbolic communication due to the social niche in which they grew up. The need for 
coordinating social interaction was the evolutionary "why". That niche was already created 
for the bonobos, and his research gives insight into the process after the first symbolic 
communication was used. But having established that bonobos and chimpanzees possess a 
latent symbolic ability makes the case easier than for the proposal by Bickerton.  
 This examination of the bonobo research indicates that symbols could have evolved 
as a response to a new social niche. It raises the next question, the question of the form of the 
first symbolic communication.  I will focus on the proposals of a gestural origin of language.  
A Gestural Origin of Language? 
 It has been proposed that language had to pass through a stage of gestural language 
before developing into vocal language [Arbib 2005; Arbib et al. 2008; Corballis 2003; 
Gentilucci and Corballis 2006; Hewes 1992; Pollick and de Waal 2007]. While there are 
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different proposals for how this happened, we can identify two main lines of arguments. The 
first is that that some studies have shown nonhuman primates to communicate differently in 
the gestural than in the vocal domain [Corballis 2003; Pollick and de Waal 2007; Schneider 
et al. 2011]. The second line of arguments is based on brain areas and neural circuits 
involved in gestures in nonhuman primates that may have served as the foundation for 
language evolution [Arbib 2005; Arbib et al. 2008]. These two lines of argument are often 
intermixed. 
 Corballis [2002; 2003] bases his argument for a gestural origin of human language on 
handedness and on studies of how nonhuman primates communicate in different modalities. 
Humans are largely right-handed but have left-sided cerebral dominance for speech and the 
lateralization of these two features is correlated. This fact is used to argue that handedness is 
caused by speech lateralization in humans. This feature, Corballis argues, can be explained if 
manual gestures, rather than vocalizations, were the origin of human language. Monkeys 
exhibit a left-side dominance for communicative gestures, but this left-sided dominance was 
gradually co-opted into control of vocalizations. This is combined with studies of nonhuman 
primate communication. Based on studies showing more gestural than vocal control in apes, 
Corballis [Corballis 2003] argues that it is reasonable to propose a last common ancestor of 
Homo and Pan that had relatively fixed calls but that the manual flexibility involved in 
climbing could have been used for gestural communication when our ancestors descended 
from the trees and developed bipedalism.  At that point, a gestural language would have 
evolved. Until fairly recently, vocalizations in this view were largely emotional additions to 
gestures. Other animals do have a left dominance for vocalizations, but the area of their brain 
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corresponding to Broca's area, which has been associated with language in humans, is mostly 
concerned with gestures.   
 Further studies argue for a gestural origin of language based upon nonhuman primate 
communication. A study by Pollick and de Waal [Pollick and de Waal 2007] found that 
chimpanzee and bonobo gestures and vocalizations differed in terms of flexibility. Flexibility 
in this study meant group differences and evidence of being tied to specific emotions. 
Vocalizations were more closely tied to specific behavioral contexts (proxy for emotions) 
and its use in one group, or even one species, predicted its use in another group or species. 
This was less the case for gestures, which the authors speculate are under greater voluntary 
control and subject to learning and cultural transmission.  According to the authors, this 
makes gestures a more likely candidate for human language. 
 Arbib [2005; 2008]  also maintains that gestures constitute the earliest stage of 
language evolution after humans split from the chimpanzee/bonobo line. His argument is 
based upon the mirror neuron system, but is further supported by the view of primate 
gestures as more flexible than primate vocalizations [Arbib 2005]. Mirror neurons are 
neurons that become active not only when an individual is performing an action but also 
when an individual observes an action performed. This system, being a basis for imitation, is 
incorporated for gestures in apes and monkeys. As our ancestors' hands were freed as they 
became terrestrial, more gestures developed. A succession of stages in language evolution 
then followed. The first was using gestures as pantomine, which developed into the protosign 
stage, the point at which signs became onventionalized. Protospeech was next step, this is to 
say, the shift from a default of sign language to a default of vocal language occurred after 
signs had became symbolic. Fully fledged language followed as the last step. 
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Criticism of the gestures-only theory 
 The idea of a sign language stage in evolution has met opposition. Some [Leavens 
2003; Leavens et al. 2010; Taglialatela et al. 2011] argue, based mainly on behavioral and 
neuroanatomical evidence from chimpanzees, that a gestural stage was not necessary or 
likely. Lieberman [2007] bases his argument against a gestural origin of language upon 
studies of both anatomical and neurological basis of speech. He argues that speech, rather 
than syntax, is what is special about human language. The position of the supralaryngal tract 
is linked to the evolution of speech. Extant chimpanzees lack both a supralaryngeal tract as 
well as brain capable of reordering a finite set of sounds into an infinite number of sentences 
and words. This is to say, issues of motor control affect what chimpanzees are capable of 
doing with their vocalizations. The neural substrates for motor control are associated with 
other cognitive processes such as syntax, which suggests that human language started 
developing when our ancestors became bipedal. In this view, fully fledged speech was 
present around 50.000 years ago.  
Evaluating the Theories 
 The theories of a gestural origin of language all rely on the idea of a protolanguage, 
some intermediate stage between the communication of LCA, and language as used by 
contemporary humans. The idea of a protolanguage has been forcefully advocated by 
Bickerton [Bickerton 1990; Bickerton 2007; Bickerton 2008]. Bickerton envisioned 
protolanguage as consisting of two-word utterances, likely vocal but Bickerton argues that 
agnosticism on the question of a gestural origin of language is most fruitful as there is no 
indication of the debate being settled with definitive evidence at the moment. However, he 
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professes a preference for the scenario that any signal (vocal, gestural, visual) would have 
been put to use [Bickerton 2007]. I agree with that position and will below further discuss 
evidence for why the gestural origin theory of language might not be the most probable. 
 The first major objection to the theories of a gestural origin of language is that their 
view of nonhuman primate gestural and vocal communication might not be accurate. It is 
also not clear that gestures are more flexible than vocalizations. Recent research has 
indicated chimpanzees modifying acoustic features of screams depending upon their 
audience [Slocombe and Zuberbuhler 2007], which indicates both situationally appropriate 
social information being transferred and potentially more voluntary vocal control than 
previously thought. An example of learning and modification of vocal signals is the bonobo 
Kanzi, participant in ape language research who understands spoken English, who might 
have modified some vocalizations to attempt to say English words [Taglialatela et al. 2003]. 
Further, there is now evidence that the chimpanzee homologue of Broca's area is activated 
during chimpanzee vocal communication and not during gestural communication 
[Taglialatela et al. 2011], which indicates that the vocalizations of LCA were using the 
substrate from which language evolved. Arbib's initial description of vocalizations as 
restricted, inflexible, and unlearned seems to be questioned even by himself [Arbib et al. 
2008].  
  It is further necessary to clarify what "flexible" means. In some cases it appears to 
signify gestures that can be used for more meanings and in more situations, while in other 
cases it seems to indicate intergroup differences. In other contexts again, flexibility signifies 
voluntary control. Intergroup differences and voluntary control are features of human spoken 
language, while use in different situations may or may not be indicative of a linguistic 
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feature. It could mean that the signal is used in different situations as a human word, or that it 
lacks specificity and thereby, referential content. This terminological confusion indicates that 
flexibility does not equal "more like human language". In contrast, it could mean lack of 
reference and specificity. 
 The fundamental question is if gestures were found to be more flexible than 
vocalizations, would that imply gestures were the sole foundation for language? That 
conclusion does not follow by necessity. The reservation above concerning what constitutes 
flexibility is one issue. But it is not clear that flexibility implies a gestural stage. It seems 
more likely that both vocalizations and gestures were employed in a multimodal form of 
language. If we hypothesize a last common ancestor with a flexible gestural communication 
system and more restrained vocalizations, who still spends a significant amount of time in the 
trees before becoming facultive and then habitually bipedal, there is no reason why better 
motorcontrol and flexibility would not have have extended to vocalizations as well as to 
gestures. This means the first protolanguage would have been multimodal. That the selection 
would have favored restricting the learning mechanisms to gesture until hominids were fully 
bipedal and had the hands free to develop a larger repertoire after which this gestural 
language would have been co-opted by speech is not obvious or parsimonious. It is not clear 
why the switch to vocal language would have occurred with a gestural language already 
established. The existence of contemporary sign languages is an indication that a gestural 
language can exhibit the same features as spoken language, and our ability for it has not been 
lost. There has to be a good evolutionary reason why the switch to spoken language as the 
default occurred and none of the proponents of a gestural origin of language have provided 
this. 
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 A theory of language evolution, including those proposing one modality of 
communication as the driving force, should be able to address the "why" of evolution. This is 
to say, not just how (what happened) but what the evolutionary forces were. Arbib describes 
how language could have evolved from gestures, but he does not discuss the evolutionary  
"why". Neither does Pollick et al. [2007]. In Corballis' account [2003] the connection 
between handedness and lateralization of language could provide a point for selection 
pressure but there is little indication of why that would have happened, or what the benefit 
would have been. Thereby, it does not address the problems raised above. Vocal control 
likely developed to new levels in the hominid evolution, but this does not necessitate a 
gestural origin of language for reasons outlined above. An important correction to Lieberman 
[Lieberman 2007] is also that while Kanzi does not have a human-like vocal language, he 
comprehends speech. This implies that at least processing of basic speech is present in both 
humans and bonobos, and that either it evolved separately in the two lines or it was a trait 
shared by LCA.  
 There is no indication in the bonobo language research that auditory or gestural 
language would have stood alone, or that a gestural language stage would have been 
necessary in language evolution. The research with the bonobos has employed both auditory 
symbols, spoken words, and visual symbols, lexigrams. Other research projects have 
employed sign language with apes, and while there are different methods and different results 
in the various research projects, there is no indication that apes find it more or less difficult to 
acquire gestural symbols, visual symbols, or comprehension of auditory symbols. This is to 
say, there is no evidence that the mode makes a significant difference. While a gestural origin 
of language cannot be excluded, a multimodal origin is the more plausible scenario. A recent 
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study (Pedersen, chapter 4, paper in preparation) studied whether visual or auditory arbitrary 
associations were easier to learn for bonobos. There was no indication of a difference, though 
a small sample size and methodological issues make the conclusions preliminary. What is of 
importance is that learning and acquisition of the symbolic relation has not been addressed in 
the studies mentioned here. A symbol needs to be learned and transmitted if it is to function 
in a system. While group differences have been addressed, the learning side that is necessary 
for developing and maintaining a symbol system, have not. If the conclusion that there is no 
difference holds, it weakens the argument for a gestural origin of language. The evidence 
from ape language research suggests that both gestural and other visual forms of 
symbolization can be acquired by great apes. This calls for caution in deriving conclusions 
about the earliest form of language.  
Conclusion 
  Two central questions regarding language evolution are whether it is an innate, 
uniquely human ability, or rather a shared learned faculty, and whether the earliest form of 
language had a gestural or a vocal form. It is argued that a broader view of how evolution 
works would improve the discussion about language evolution. Focusing on niche 
construction theories, it is argued that this is a relevant perspective to apply to language 
evolution. Language research with a group of bonobos provides a starting point and initial 
input into what new environments could do to an organism in terms of language abilities. The 
discussion between Chomsky et. al[Hauser et al. 2002] on the one side, and Pinker et al. 
[Jackendoff and Pinker 2005; Pinker and Jackendoff 2005] on the other side misses the point 
133 
 
both through their focus on grammar instead of symbols and because they do not account for 
the interaction of language, culture, and brain.  
  Regarding the claims of a gestural origin of language, new studies of primate (ape) 
vocalizations raise doubt as to whether primate gestures really are more flexible than their 
vocalizations. Further, there seems to be no logical necessity to exclude vocalizations as 
equal parts of the first form of language after hominids became bipedal even if the gestures 
of extant apes are more flexible than their vocalizations. Rather, the first stages in language 
evolution were multimodal. Research with bonobos also indicates no difference in the ability 
to acquire visual or auditory symbolic relations, a feature important in order for a symbolic 
system to spread but not thoroughly addressed by the current theories of gestural origin of 
language.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
Animal thought and language 
 Cognitive and behavioral studies of nonhuman primates can provide insights into how 
symbols affect a primate brain, thereby empirically investigating the old philosophical debate 
regarding language and thought. This debate has centered on whether thought depends on 
language, and whether forms of language determines thought. Answers to this question come 
with implications for language evolution, in that some scenarios become more likely than 
others, depending upon how language relates to other cognitive areas. 
 In this dissertation, I revealed how ape language research can provide new insights 
into the questions of language evolution and how symbols affect the primate mind. In 
particular, I addressed the question of how language and thought, language and other 
cognitive abilities, interact.  I then used my results to address how symbolic communication 
might have changed the cognition of hominids, and thereby inform theories of language 
evolution. My study of how nonhuman primates acquire symbolic communication may 
indicate that the social niche has been part of the selection pressure involved in shaping 
conceptual and other abilities existing in nonhuman primates (and thereby, likely our last 
common ancestor with chimpanzees and bonobos)  into human language.  
 Other questions discussed in this dissertation are whether language was based on a 
new "invention" or a conglomerate of preexisting abilities, as well as whether nonhuman 
primate gestural or vocal communication serve as the better model for the origin of language. 
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Summary 
 In the first chapter, I introduced the research participants in this dissertation, the 
bonobos at the Great Ape Trust of Iowa, previously the Language Research Center, Georgia, 
Atlanta. They are part of a long term ape language research project, initiated by Duane 
Rumbaugh and Sue Savage-Rumbaugh [Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin 1994; Savage-
Rumbaugh et al. 1978]. I placed the current dissertation research in the context of the history 
of ape language projects, as well as in the philosophical discussion of the relationship 
between thought and language. Classic empiricist [Hume 1978 (1739)] and rationalist 
[Descartes 2006 (1637)] positions set the stage for the discussion of how language and 
thought interact, a discussion personified by Skinner's behaviorism [Skinner 1957] and 
Chomsky's cognitive revolution [Chomsky 1984] in contemporary psycholinguistics and 
comparative psychology.  
 The second chapter seeks to place my research in an (ongoing) debate between field 
and captive researchers. This is both to argue that I find captive research able to address 
questions difficult to address in the field and to argue that the debate has missed some crucial 
issues. These issues are pertinent to the topics of this dissertation. They include the 
assumptions made regarding the differences between humans and nonhumans and how these 
affect the appropriate method for cognitive comparison. Boesch [2007]  assumes the 
existence of one nature for a nonhuman species, and captivity alters this nature. However, 
this assumption is not applied equally to humans and apes, as it would  be difficult to see 
which human group would constitute an appropriate one for comparison. Rather, I argue, a 
rich captive environment can provide important insight into the norm of reaction of behavior 
in apes, especially how they react to new social conditions. Such knowledge can provide an 
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idea of what potential variation was present in early hominid evolution and how early 
hominids would have reacted to social and environmental change.  
 Another partially overlooked issue in cognitive comparisons of humans and apes is 
language. While it is sometimes acknowledged that linguistic instructions give humans an 
advantage in cognitive comparisons, it is not recognized that a symbolic code might change 
cognition in other ways. Apes are capable of acquiring a symbolic communication code [Lyn 
and Savage-Rumbaugh 2000; Miles 1997; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1998]. This makes it 
possible for more accurate comparisons, and for posing new questions, such as how symbols 
change a mind, and what this means for language evolution.  
 The third chapter details a study on the ability of bonobos to assign photos of 
naturally occurring items to their proper categories in a computerized match-to-sample task. 
The central question is whether the possession of a symbolic code, including symbols for the 
categories under study, improves a bonobo's ability to correctly categorize the items. The 
results showed that symbolically competent bonobos performed significantly better than 
bonobos without symbolic training. Additional tests were conducted to exclude previous 
experience with experimental tasks as a possible explanation, and to verify that individuals 
were correctly assigned to the symbolically competent group or the control group. This was 
accomplished through a series of match-to-sample tests targeting comprehension of 
lexigrams and spoken words.  
 My results suggest that symbolic communication could have enhanced and/or 
influenced cognition in domains other than linguistic communication. In this light, the old 
dichotomy between viewing language as an isolated, recently evolved, ability, and the view 
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of language as determining thought, must be rethought. Symbols influence other domains of 
cognition than language, but this relationship is not deterministic.  
 The fourth chapter deals with the issue of the learnability of visual and auditory 
arbitrary relations. The bonobos again participated. Here, I also addressed whether the 
previous possession of a symbolic code facilitated the acquisition of new symbols. The 
question of symbolic relations and who is capable of learning and using a symbol, is 
pertinent due to the central role symbols play in theories of language evolution [Bickerton 
2009; Deacon 1997; Schoenemann 2009] and of evolution of human culture in general [Klein 
and Edgar 2002].  I found no difference between the symbolically competent bonobos and 
the control group, and I found no difference between auditory or visual arbitrary relations. It 
is possible that the lack of difference between the symbolically competent group and the 
control group is due to the lack of motivation of one individual. However, the results do not 
support the gestural origin of language theory because the visual associations were not easier 
to learn than the auditory relations. Combined with other evidence from both behavioral and 
neuro-imaging studies [Hopkins et al. 2007; Leavens et al. 2010; Taglialatela et al. 2007; 
Taglialatela et al. 2011], it seems more likely that the first form of language was multimodal. 
 In the fifth chapter, I aimed to unify the lessons drawn from bonobo language 
research regarding language evolution. Two main issues are addressed in this chapter. The 
first is whether language is a shared ability, likely consisting of a mix of abilities we share 
with extant apes, or whether language is an isolated ability that evolved only in the hominid 
lineage. Language is a phenomenon consisting of a range of abilities. Therefore, we need to 
be precise about which part of language we refer to when claiming that something evolved or 
is present in other species. Different elements of language are unlikely to have had the same 
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evolutionary history. The answer to this question is related to how language and thought 
interrelates as well as the ability of other species, especially nonhuman primates, to exhibit 
the different abilities involved in language. The second issue regards the form of the first 
linguistic communication. More precisely, I address the question whether language had an 
origin in gestures, which has been argued both based on the appearance of primate gestures 
being more flexible than their vocal communication, and on studies of mirror neuron systems 
[Arbib 2005; Pollick and de Waal 2007]. The current data, both from the current dissertation, 
and from other studies, does not support the gestures-only theory, but suggests that a 
multimodal origin of language is more probable. 
 The results from my dissertation research indicate that symbolic capacities, a central 
feature of language, has precursors in non-human primates and that the right conditions can 
enable these symbolic capacities to develop into a symbolic communication code. It also 
suggests that these symbolic capacities changed the cognition of these individuals in ways 
other than allowing them to communicate symbolically. To explain why the preexisting 
abilities flourished into human language, social niche construction is a probable force to 
invoke. While the empirical studies in my dissertation addressed symbolic capacities, not 
syntax, there are proposals suggesting that syntax could develop out of the relationship 
between symbols [Deacon 1997; Schoenemann 2009]. The important insight is that an 
invention of a new cognitive module to deal with syntax is not necessary.  
The language and thought debate revisited 
 My research does not support the strong version of the Saphir-Worf hypothesis [Sapir 
1983], that thought is dependent upon and determined by language. It neither supports the 
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Chomskian view of language as an isolated uniquely human ability [Chomsky 1979]. I 
conclude that, at least the conceptual abilities, which are present in some form in many 
species, are influenced by the presence of an external symbol. The ability to acquire such a 
symbol is in the reach of the Great Apes, such as bonobos [Gardner and Gardner 1991; 
Gardner and Gardner 1985].  It is possible that conceptual abilities could have influenced 
other areas of cognition in our evolutionary past and that of our closest living relatives. More 
research is needed to establish which capabilities are influenced, the exact nature of the 
influence, and specifically, how conceptual abilities may affect other areas of language. 
 Chapter 1 gave an introduction to how empiricism, in the classic form of Hume 
[Hume 1978 (1739)] saw the mechanisms underlying language acquisition as not 
qualitatively different from those involved in any other learning process. This is to say, there 
is no specialized ability for language, only more advanced forms of basic associative 
principles that are involved in thinking in general, and which  are found across species.  
 Rationalism, on the other hand [Descartes 2006 (1637)], saw a strict division between 
humans and animals in that humans have a mind, the evidence of which is language. This 
mind, and the basis of language, were seen as innate concepts. In modern day Chomskian 
linguistics [Chomsky 1983] this role of an innate uniquely human faculty is replaced by 
language, more specifically the faculty of grammar. This means that thought and language 
become dissociated, and in particular, that grammar is not influenced by the conceptual and 
semantic side of language.  
 The modern versions of empiricism and rationalism, in the form of Chomsky's classic 
writing and Skinner's behaviorism, fall short of explaining the data presented in this 
dissertation, especially in chapter 3. If the human ability for language is largely unaffected by 
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other cognitive processes as proposed by Chomsky, it is difficult to explain why the mastery 
of a symbolic mode of communication facilitates categorizing new items. Chomsky would 
object to this interpretation, stating that the faculty of language in his view is not concerned 
with meaning, only grammar in various forms. Consequently, the fact that symbols influence 
categorization skills would not be relevant for his conception of language. However, 
grammatical relations are involved in meaning as they aid in deciphering the meaning of a 
sentence [Schoenemann 2009]. As argued at length in chapter 5 and below, syntax is not 
separated from semantics in our daily use of language, and there are credible theories as to 
how grammar, (e.g. syntax), could have co-evolved with semantics and symbols rather than 
strictly separated from them [Deacon 1997; Schoenemann 2009]. In this light, the Chomskian 
objection relies upon a sharp distinction that is highly questionable. While the current study 
does not address the influence of symbols on grammatical competencies directly, I studied 
the influence of symbols on categorization, and found a significant influence. Future research 
could investigate directly the influence of symbols on aspects of grammar, as suggested 
below under "Future directions". We can conclude now, though, that grammar is not 
separated from the meaning of a sentence but aids in deciphering the meaning. 
- "Grammatical rules and categories are symbolic rules and categories. 
Syntactic structure is just physical regularity when considered irrespective 
of the symbolic operations it is intended to encode" [Deacon 1997] 
 A good example is the performance of Kanzi in the study comparing his sentence 
comprehension with the comprehension by a human infant, Alia [Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 
1993]. It is clear in the data that Kanzi makes fewer errors in the sentences where the 
grammar facilitates the comprehension of who should do what to whom or what, than 
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sentences where the difficulty rested in other capacities,  such as memory. This is a point that 
has been made by Savage-Rumbaugh and her colleagues [Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 2009], to 
signify that grammar and function words actually helped Kanzi's understanding of the 
sentence. I believe the argument can be pushed even further, to claim that since grammar aids 
in meaning at present, it might have evolved as part of the meaning pcomponent of linguistic 
communication.  
 The behaviorist position cannot easily explain my results either. According to 
behaviorism, the learning mechanisms should have remained the same. The possession of a 
symbol, in this view, does not change how subsequent stimuli are apprehended. However, the 
fact that Kanzi and Panbanisha transferred their high level of performance to subsequent sets 
of stimuli in the categorical matching task, while the non-symbolically competent bonobos 
did not transfer learning as easily, indicates that something other than operant conditioning is 
taking place. We cannot reduce the learning mechanisms involved in language to simple 
conditioning or an innate faculty possessing the necessary information for language with 
minimal environmental influence needed. According to Deacon, symbolic thought and 
language is a new way of understanding relations between stimuli, not merely a quantitative 
improvement in memory and stimulus-response [Deacon 1997]. My research results are 
better explained by Deacon's proposal than by what Chomsky, Skinner, or Pinker propose. 
 Fodor [Fodor 1975] posited the idea of a language of thought, taking to the extreme 
the idea prominent in philosophy that thought depends upon language [Carruthers and 
Boucher 1998]. While it is possible to define thought in a way that makes it dependent upon 
language, I have rephrased the issue of the influence of symbols on cognition. Still, the 
claims of thought being dependent upon language do not correspond to the performance of 
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the non-symbolically competent bonobos or the performance of nonhuman primates in a 
wide array of experimental tasks, such as memory [Crystal 2011], categorization [Vigo and 
Allen 2009], and social knowledge [Cheney and Seyfarth 2007]. For overview, see [Boysen 
and Himes 1999; Tomasello and Call 1997]. While it is possible to define thought in a way 
that excludes anything not verbally communicated, such a definition does little to explain or 
understand human or nonhuman cognition. Many aspects of human cognition, including 
those defined as reportable by language, depend upon unconscious cognitive operations that 
are not verbalized and are not directly accessible to the  individual [Lakoff and Johnson 
1999].  
 My data is to a certain extent compatible with the proposal by Chomsky, Hauser, and 
Fitch [Hauser et al. 2002] discussed in chapter 5; however, I argue that their approach has 
major issues in that they maintain a focus on how recursion could have evolved. I have 
argued that grammar should not be seen as separate from semantics. Their view of the 
evolutionary process also does not include niche construction theory, which I will return to 
below. They do acknowledge that conceptual machinery is involved both in language and in 
cognition in general, and to a large extent shared with other species. But their approach 
leaves out the crucial aspect of the transition from non-language to language and instead 
focuses on the current content of FLN and FLB. I argue that niche construction theory is the 
most promising avenue to address the transition from a mode of communication we do not 
recognize as language to a mode of communication we do recognize as language.  
 The data presented in this dissertation is, however, incompatible with the proposal by 
Pinker and Jackendorf [2005] that the ability for conceptual thought is not shared by other 
species, and only reserved for language in humans. They acknowledge that symbols are 
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central for language, but describes a large amount of abilities involved in language as innate 
uniquely human abilities.  
The implications for language evolution 
 It has been argued that the possession of symbols exerts an influence on areas of 
cognition other than merely language. This has implication for how we think about language 
evolution. Theories stating that symbolism is a, if not the, crucial aspect of language as 
argued by Deacon [Deacon 1997] makes sense in this perspective. His argument that 
symbolism required a new mode of computation, rather than merely added cognitive power, 
is also compatible in this perspective. In this view, relations between symbols is what 
initiated syntax and grammar.  
 Chapter 5 argued that co-evolution and niche construction must be invoked to explain 
language evolution. The abilities of Kanzi and his family, and the way those abilities were 
acquired, present a particularly telling case for how and why this happened. Jablonka and 
Lamb argue that certain categories are found across languages and provide the basis for 
grammatical relations [Jablonka and Lamb 2005]. Kanzi is used as a case study for the 
prerequisites for symbolic communication. They raise the question why humans evolved 
language, rather than the bonobos, since both possess the conceptual prerequisites. Their 
response is that changes in both ecology and sociality when humans left the forests might 
have contributed to the development of language. Upright position freed hands for gestural 
communication, and facilitated the descended larynx necessary for speech. These general 
observations are the first step towards using niche construction theory to inform our 
understanding of how language evolved. Kanzi and Panbanisha acquired symbolic 
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communication because emotionally important others in their environment used speech and 
lexigrams. More specifically, a specific social niche initiated their use of a mode of 
communication that other bonobos do not use. Bicketon [2009] argues that the need for 
recruitment of help needed for big game scavenging was the niche that necessitated symbolic 
communication in hominid evolution. That is a possible scenario, but it is important that he 
does not grant the symbolic competencies to the bonobos as do the directly published 
research [Benson et al. 2002; Fields and Savage-Rumbaugh 2003; Lyn and Savage-
Rumbaugh 2000; Rilling et al. 2000; Savage-Rumbaugh and Fields 2000a; Savage-
Rumbaugh and Fields 2000b; Savage-Rumbaugh and Fields 2000c; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 
2000; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 2001; Schick et al. 1999; Shanker et al. 1999; Taglialatela et 
al. 2003] and the interpretation by Deacon [1997]. If the case of bonobo language research 
(and potentially other animal language projects) is not taken into account, the need for a 
significant neural and/or genetic change before the first symbolic communication becomes 
pressing, and needs an explanation - an explanation not provided by Bickerton. If bonobos, 
given the right social niche, are not capable of mastering a symbolic mode of 
communication, it is necessary to explain why Homo erectus, as suggested by Bickerton, 
developed a proto-language consisting of symbols. What had changed that made them 
capable of making that leap? In this way, his account might face the same issues as he 
correctly criticizes Chomsky et al. for, in leaving out the transition from language to non-
language.  
.  The issue of the descended larynx, referred to by Jablonka and Lamb, has been 
questioned by recent research [Fitch 2010]. Other species than humans have been shown to 
have a descended larynx during vocalizations, without development of other aspects of 
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human language. This has brought increased attention to the neural circuits underlying 
vocalizations, motorcontrol, rather than an external anatomical feature [Lieberman 2007]. It 
has been argued that the placement of the tongue is a human-specific trait, rather than the 
descended larynx [Fitch 2005; Lieberman 2007].  
 My research casts doubt on the gestures-only theory of language evolution. Albeit not 
specifically addressing gestures, the data in chapter 4 on visual and auditory symbolic 
relations makes a multimodal origin of language more probable than the gestures-only 
scenario. While the current study cannot refute it, discussing the forms of the origin of 
language in context of other evidence as well as theoretical considerations makes a 
multimodal origin most likely. This is to say, gestures, vocalizations, and potentially 
externalized symbols could have played a role given the evidence we have now. The 
fundamental problem facing gesture-only theories of language evolution is that there is no 
convincing reason why the switch to a mainly vocal mode would have occurred [Fitch 2010]. 
The current existence of sign language, and the co-occurrence of speech and gestures during 
human linguistic communication [McNeil 2005] are evidence  that visual and auditory modes 
of communication can co-occur, and that a fully fledged language of signs is possible, raising 
doubt why it would have been abandoned if it had evolved first.  
Future directions 
 Future work on the thought-language question, framed as how symbols affect other 
cognitive operations, should address cognitive areas such as memory and whether symbols 
aid memory, expand on concept formation, syntax formation and comprehension, and gesture 
use and comprehension. All this can be done in a comparative framework, elaborating on the 
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idea exposed in this dissertation that symbolically competent apes provide an option of 
posing questions regarding how organisms with or without a symbolic system compares.   
 Notably, future research could be expanded to include more individuals with 
symbolic competencies. While not many individuals with the relevant symbolic 
competencies exist, at least three individuals could be included in future studies. These 
individuals are Lana, Sherman, and Panpanzee, all chimpanzees who acquired the lexigrams 
as participants in earlier stages of the language research program in which the bonobos are 
participants [Rumbaugh 1977; Savage-Rumbaugh 1984; Savage-Rumbaugh 1986]. The 
methods would need to be adopted for these individuals, for instance it is possible that types 
of pictures used and choice of lexigrams should be changed. In the categorical matching task 
detailed in chapter 3, the pictures resembled food and animals the bonobos are familiar with. 
Different food items might be pertinent to the chimpanzees. The photos chosen for the 
lexigram-knowledge test would require same adjustment.  
 A computerized match-to-sample test was chosen for the studies presented in this 
dissertation, though this is not the only method available. The best method for including the 
chimpanzees would depend upon their familiarity with the tasks, though it seems feasible to 
continue with a computerized match-to-sample task. The methodological issues in chapter 4, 
based upon what a symbol is, would have to be addressed.  
 To address the question of rate of acquisition in a different way, one approach could 
be to introduce a new lexigram to the bonobos and compare its rate of acquisition with notes 
from their infancy (to the degree  those notes are available). It would also be interesting to 
expand the repertoire to include a third form of symbols, gestures. However, this cannot be 
done using the computerized match-to-sample tests. It would be preferable to use the same 
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test for auditory, visual, and then gestural symbolic relations, to compare. This would mean 
designing a new way to test for the ease and tempi of acquisition for all three modes of 
association. 
 Many theoretical considerations regarding concepts and methods had to be addressed 
in this dissertation. In this dissertation I have aimed to address basic questions of how 
symbols affect cognition, and how that relationship informs theories of language evolution, 
from the perspective of bonobo language research. It is my hope that continued research will 
provide even more insight into these questions.  
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